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The 2020 election season placed remarkable pressure on the U.S. election system.
As the COVID-19 pandemic ravaged a politically polarized nation, American
voters challenged a range of election regulations, looking to the courts for relief
from laws that made voting particularly onerous during extraordinary circumstances. An examination of election law jurisprudence over this period reveals,
among other things, the judiciary's repeated reliance on a single case: Purcell v.
Gonzalez. While its holding is less than clear, the decision in Purcell, at its core,
governs the appropriateness of judicial intervention in election disputes on the eve
of a political contest. The Court could have elucidated Purcell's true meaning
during this unique election cycle but, instead, it seems to have made matters worse.
This Article argues that the Supreme Court's repeated invocation of Purcell during
the 2020 election cycle introduced an empty vessel for unprincipled decisionmaking
and inconsistent rulings that only served to aggrandize election-related concerns,
ultimately harming the nation's most vulnerable voters. Part I describes the facts in

Purcell, and what one might contend is its central holding. Part II highlights the
chief deficiencies of the case, revealing a fundamental incoherence in its reasoning
that augments the potential for government actors-including courts-to exploit
Purcell in the lead up to an election. PartIII examines more closely the judiciary's
application of Purcell in the 2020 primaries and general election, revealing the dangers it poses to voting rights and the democratic process.
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INTRODUCTION

When history is written, the 2020 election cycle will, for a panoply
of reasons, rank among the country's most memorable and most consequential. At the start of the primary calendar, the country began to

face a novel virus, leading to a public health crisis that has, as of the
writing of this Article, lasted for over a year. The coronavirus out-

break quickly altered the core campaign issues. Americans who had
only recently tuned into presidential impeachment proceedings soon
found themselves confined at home focusing on the pandemic itself
and the toll it was taking on the economy.1 COVID-19's impact on
election administration was also swift and stark, requiring election
officials and lawmakers to innovate and demonstrate flexibility to

safeguard the democratic process and, simultaneously, human lives. 2
Through it all, a record-breaking number of election-related lawsuits

were filed to challenge, among other things, accommodations made to
facilitate adherence to social distancing and other safety protocols as
voting got underway. 3 Nevertheless, and almost surprisingly, there
1 See Christina Wilkie, Three Pillarsof Trump's Case for Reelection Are CollapsingAll

at Once, CNBC (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/19/coronavirus-crisistrumps-argument-for-reelection-is-collapsing.html (describing the dramatic reversal of
Trump's re-election prospects following the Dow's plunge at the onset of the pandemic
compared with his relatively high approval ratings post-impeachment acquittal just one
month prior).
2 See COVID-19 and 2020 Primary Elections, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES,
(July 2, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/state-action-oncovid-19-and-elections.aspx (listing legislative and executive actions taken by states in
response to COVID-19 and its effect on elections).
3 Lila Hassan & Dan Glaun, COVID-19 and the Most Litigated Presidential Election in
Recent U.S. History: How the Lawsuits Break Down, PBS: FRONTLINE (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/covid-19-most-litigated-presidential-election-inrecent-us-history ("With more than two months left in the year, 2020 has already outpaced

the 196 election lawsuits filed before and after the 2000 election...."). The Stanford-MIT
Healthy Elections Project has catalogued 625 cases and appeals comprising 433 "case
families (i.e. all cases and appeals arising from a single complaint) in 46 states plus D.C.
and Puerto Rico" stemming from the pandemic alone. See Covid-Related Election
Litigation Tracker, STANFORD-MIT HEALTHY ELECTIONS PROJECT, https://

healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu (last visited May 20, 2021); see also Richard L.
Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 29 (2007) [hereinafter

Hasen, Untimely Death] ("The rise in election law litigation since 2000 is part of a trend I
have termed 'election law as . . . political strategy."' (quoting Richard L. Hasen, Beyond
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was unprecedented voter turnout. Despite the myriad attempts at
voter suppression and interference as the pandemic ravaged the

country, an unprecedented 158 million Americans-through sheer grit
and with the assistance of dedicated election administrators-exercised their right to the franchise. 4
The nontraditional nature of the election continued even after

the votes were cast, as the presidency of Donald Trump, already unrivaled for its routine norm-breaking conduct, barreled towards its
nadir. First was his use of the bully pulpit to propagate false-often
racist-claims about voter fraud. 5 Following that came his obstinate

refusal to concede the election even after pivotal states certified their
results. 6 Next came a complex yet strikingly unsophisticated legal

effort to disenfranchise millions of Americans, backed by a dozenand-a-half Republican states' attorneys general and nearly two-thirds
of that party's sitting members of the House of Representatives. 7
the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral
Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 944 (2005))).
4 See Rani Molla, Voter Turnout Is Estimated to Be the Highest in 120 Years, Vox
(Nov. 4, 2020, 8:45 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/11/4/21549010/voter-turnout-recordestimate-election-2020; FED. ELECTION COMM'N, OFFICIAL 2020 PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL
ELECTION RESULTS 8 (2021), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/

2020presgeresults.pdf (placing the final popular vote tally at 158,383,403).
5 E.g., Brandon Tensley, The Racist Rhetoric Behind Accusing Largely Black Cities of
Voter Fraud, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/20/politics/trump-giuliani-black-cities-

analysis/index.html (Nov. 20, 2020, 12:03 PM).
6 See, e.g., Melissa Quinn, Pennsylvania Certifies Election Results, Confirming Biden
Victory, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/pennsylvania-certifies-presidentialelection-results (Nov. 24, 2020, 7:42 PM) ("Mr. Trump has said he will not concede .... ");
Andrew Oxford, Arizona Secretary of State Certifies Election Results with Biden Winning

State's 11 Electoral Votes,

AZCENTRAL,

https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/

elections/2020/11/30/arizona-secretary-state-certify-election-results-monday/6444577002

(Nov. 30, 2020, 4:06 PM) ("Still, less than 2 miles from the [Phoenix] Capitol, several
Republican legislators held an event with Trump campaign lawyers, including Rudy
Giuliani, who claimed lawmakers could and should throw out the results of the election.");
Kate Brumback, Georgia Again Certifies Election Results Showing Biden Won, AP NEWS

(Dec. 7, 2020), https://apnews.comlarticle/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-georgiaelections-4eeea3b24f10de886bcdeab6c26b680a ("Georgia's top elections official on
Monday recertified the state's election results after a recount requested by President
Donald Trump .... ").
7 See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg & Nick Corasaniti, 'An Indelible Stain' How the G.O.P.
Tried to Topple a Pillar of Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/12/

us/politics/trump-lawsuits-electoral-college.html (Jan. 18, 2021); see also Donald J. Trump
for President, Inc. v. Sec'y of Pa., 830 F. App'x 377, 390 (3d Cir. 2020) ("The Campaign
would have us set aside 1.5 million ballots without even alleging fraud."); Kelly v.
Commonwealth, 240 A.3d 1255, 1256 (Pa. 2020) ("Petitioners sought to invalidate the
ballots of the millions of Pennsylvania voters who utilized the mail-in voting procedures[,

or to have] the court disenfranchise all 6.9 million Pennsylvanians who voted in the
General Election and instead 'direct[] the General Assembly to choose Pennsylvania's
electors.'" (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Petition for Review
at 24, Kelly v. Commonwealth, 240 A.3d 1255 (Pa. 2020) (No. 68 MAP 2020))); Motion for
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Then the feather in the cap of the four-year term characterized by an
unprecedented disparagement of democracy and the rule of law: The
incumbent president incited his supporters to violently lay siege on
the Capitol to thwart the counting of electoral votes-the culmination
of the presidential election process.8
These major occurrences have, understandably, cast a shadow on
many other events. As such, one might be forgiven for missing
another important development: the Supreme Court's repeated invocation of Purcell v. Gonzalez.9 In Purcell, the Court reversed a Ninth
Circuit decision to enjoin a new Arizona voter identification law just

two and a half weeks before the 2006 general election, finding that the
appeals court failed to show both that it considered the timing of the
election and that it evaluated the potential effect the injunction would
have on voting. 10 The number of opinions from this past election cycle

referencing the case that, among other things, urges courts to think
twice before ruling in election challenges in the lead-up to voting was
quite astounding.1 1 For election law scholars and practitioners alike,
2020 will also be remembered as the cycle during which Purcell all but
cemented its place in the pantheon of U.S. election-law principles.
The year of the "pandemic primaries" and general presidential election might also be called the year of Purcell.
Scholars have criticized the Court following its 2006 Purcell
ruling. Daniel Tokaji said the opinion could "charitably be described
as careless," before predicting it would spell doom for plaintiffs in
Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 40, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 1230 (2020) (No.
22015) (requesting that the Court "Enjoin Defendant States' use of the 2020 election
results for the Office of President to appoint presidential electors to the Electoral
College").
8 See Ryan Goodman, Mari Dugas & Nicholas Tonckens, Incitement Timeline: Year of
Trump's Actions Leading to the Attack on the Capitol, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 11, 2021),

https://justsecurity.org/74138/incitement-timeline-year-of-trumps-actions-leading-to-theattack-on-the-capitol (providing "a detailed timeline of President Donald Trump's
statements and actions relevant to the case that he incited the attack on the Capitol on Jan.
6, 2021"). Even after insurrectionists targeted the heads of our constitutional government,
147 federal lawmakers, including eight senators, objected to the electoral vote count on
meritless claims. Karen Yourish, Larry Buchanan & Denise Lu, The 147 Republicans Who
2
Voted to Overturn Election Results, N.Y. TIMEs, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/20 1/
01/07/us/elections/electoral-college-biden-objectors.html (Jan. 7, 2021).
9 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam).
10 The Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the district court specifically "[i]n
view of the impending election, the necessity for clear guidance to the State of Arizona,
and our conclusion regarding the Court of Appeals' issuance of the order"-that is, the
Ninth's procedural failure to "give deference to the discretion of the District Court."
Id. at 5.
11 See discussion infra Part III.
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Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.'2 Richard Hasen, who

coined the phrase "Purcell principle," described the decision as "both
overdetermined and undertheorized."' 3 More recently, Nicholas
Stephanopoulos asserted that even a decade and a half after the decision, Purcell's holding "remains remarkably opaque."' 4 Astute as
these observations are, it is unclear whether anyone could have foreseen the full extent of Purcell'spotency-or envisioned the damage it

was capable of causing. A sad, even if understandable, attempt to
cope with the harsh realities of election administration has become
unmoored from its purpose and origins. Simple guidance for judicial
decisionmaking on the eve of elections has been thoughtlessly
applied-and tragically overexploited-such that it has become part
of the problem. Nothing proves this better than Purcell in the
pandemic.
That is exactly what this Article contends. Unmasking Purcell

during the pandemic reveals the principle as vacuous, selfcontradictory, amorphous, and more prone to aggrandizing election-

related concerns-including those that the Supreme Court suggested
it should mitigate. Because it empowers the Court to frustrate care-

fully crafted opinions and orders, it remains susceptible to manipulation for political gain, and typically produces predictably partisan

outcomes. A review of the Court's admonitions in the case, and its
application in the 2020 cycle, exposes Purcell for what it actually is: an
ersatz legal principle that risks corrupting the entire field.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides some back-

ground about Purcell. It describes the facts of the original case, as well
as its central holding. Part II draws on some of the most salient schol-

arly critiques, highlighting some of Purcell'schief deficiencies. To that,
I add my own assessment: Purcell is mostly a charade. The holding
possesses a certain superficial appeal but, when reduced to its core,
Purcell's tenets are either well-established or commonsensical. More
problematic, however, is its incoherence. Its reasoning overempha12 Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave It to the Lower Courts: On JudicialIntervention in Election
Administration, 68 OMO ST. L.J. 1065, 1087 (2007); see id. at 1092 (expressing concern for
the effect of Purcell on Crawford, which had recently been granted certiorari, and arguing

that "the Court should have awaited a case presenting a more fully developed record");
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (affirming the lower courts'
conclusion that "the evidence in the record was not sufficient to support a facial attack [by
plaintiffs] on the validity of the entire statute").
13 Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 440

(2016). Hasen defines "the Purcell principle" as "the idea that courts should not issue
orders which change election rules in the period just before the election." Id. at 428.
14 Nicholas Stephanopoulos, FreeingPurcellfrom the Shadows, TAKE CARE (Sept. 27,
2020), https://takecareblog.com/blog/freeing-purcell-from-the-shadows.
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sizes the threat of voter confusion relative to more important election
concerns, yet the action the Court takes only exacerbates the potential
for the very same confusion it was purportedly designed to combat.
Also notable is what is absent from the decision. It provides no guidance as to the weight the principle carries or where it fits into the
equitable relief analysis, and it ignores-and perhaps augments-the
potential for government actors, including courts, to use Purcell to put
their thumbs on the scale.
Finally, Part III briefly endeavors to demonstrate these points

using some examples from the 2020 pandemic primaries and the general election. The extraordinary nature of the pandemic should
arguably have revealed the limits of a principle governing the appropriateness of extraordinary election-related relief. Yet, virtually
without fail, Purcell's shortcomings were laid bare in the cases where
the Court cited it or suggested that it applied. Far from contributing to
election law jurisprudence, Purcell has constructed an empty vessel

for unprincipled decisionmaking and consistently results in rulings
that are detrimental to the nation's most vulnerable voters.

I
PURCELL AS PROLOGUE

In May 2006, residents of Arizona, American Indian tribes, and
community groups filed suit in federal district court challenging the
state's new voter identification law, which required proof of citizen-

15
ship to both register to vote and cast one's ballot on election day.

Plaintiffs also requested a preliminary injunction to bar the law's

enforcement. The district court denied the request for relief in
September in a summary order lacking factual findings and legal conclusions. 16 Plaintiffs appealed the denial, also requesting an injunction

to prevent the law from being enforced for the upcoming election. In
early October, pending appeal and upon consideration of "lengthy
written responses from the State and the county officials," a two-judge

motions/screening panel of the Ninth Circuit issued its own summary
order.1 7 While it, too, lacked an explanation, the order granted the
interim relief requested; it enjoined the law's enforcement pending
circuit disposition of the district court's decision and scheduled
15 Purcell, 549 U.S. at 2-3.

16 Order at 2, Gonzalez v. Arizona, No. 06-cv-01268 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2006), ECF No.
183 (denying the motions for preliminary injunction and noting that "[d]etailed findings of
fact and conclusions of law will follow"); Purcell, 549 U.S. at 3.
17 Purcell, 549 U.S. at 3.
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briefing, which would close two weeks after the election.1 8 Days after
the panel's decision, the district court issued a post hoc opinion articulating its factual findings and conclusions of law for its September
order. 19 The court held that plaintiffs had demonstrated "a possibility
of success on the merits," yet it was unable to conclude that this was
"a strong likelihood." 2 0 The district court also found that the balance
of hardships and the public interest favored the state, establishing support for its earlier decision to deny the injunction. 21 State and county
officials appealed the Ninth Circuit's interlocutory injunction,
requesting the Supreme Court vacate the order. 22
The Court issued a per curiam order granting the request to
vacate the injunction. In doing so, it offered its own cursory assessment, highlighting two key points as the rationale for its decision.

First, it emphasized the destabilizing effect of judicial intervention in
the political process on the eve of an election, specifically its potential
to confuse voters and discourage their participation. 23 Moreover, it
warned that "[a]s an election draws closer, that risk will increase." 24
Second, it admonished appellate courts to show some deference to
lower courts' discretionary rulings and, when in disagreement, to provide explanatory facts and legal analysis. 25 Because the Court of

Appeals did not extend this deference or justify its disagreement, the
Supreme Court allowed the voter identification law to take effect. 26

II
PARSING FOR PRINCIPLE

While the initial response to Purcell was fairly limited, there was
a steady uptick as courts began to rely on it with greater frequency.
Overall, commentators have been cool to it, to say the least. Some
18 Order, Gonzalez v. Arizona, No. 06-16702 (9th Cir. Oct. 5, 2006); see also Gonzalez
v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing the order on appeal).
19 Gonzalez v. Arizona, No. CV 06-1268-PHX, 2006 WL 8431038 (D. Ariz. Oct. 12,
2006).
20 Id. at *4 (quoting Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 919
(9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)).
21 Id. at *4, *9.

22 Purcell, 549 U.S. at 2.
23 Id. at 4-5. ("Court orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can
themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the

polls.").
24 Id. at 5.
25 See id. ("It was still necessary, as a procedural matter, for the Court of Appeals to

give deference to the discretion of the District Court. We find no indication that it did so,
and we conclude this was error.").

26 Id. at 5 (noting the absence of any "explanation ... by the Court of Appeals showing
the ruling and findings of the District Court to be incorrect").
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27
criticize the fact that Purcell is a product of the "shadow docket."
These cases are governed by processes that are even less transparent
than the Court's already-opaque standard operating rules and are
often resolved through scantly worded orders issued on a compressed
29
timetable 28 that permits neither proper briefing nor oral argument.
Others have disparaged Purcell's sloppy reasoning, which is thought

to be a product of the Court's hasty review and disposition of the

case. 30 Problematic still, is Purcell's vague notion of election-eve: The
decision implies the existence of a deadline after which judges should
alter their normal conduct, but does not offer one. 31 Overall, the
Court has failed "to articulate a deeper understanding of Purcell,
including its contours and its potential exceptions." 32
In light of these shortcomings, one might ask, what value does

Purcell add? The short answer, frankly, is very little. Indeed, much of
what the case might claim as its chief virtues is rather unremarkable

because the principles it promulgates are either reasonably wellestablished or commonsensical. Furthermore, the stated yet unquali-

fied need to avoid voter confusion, the Court's lodestar, is overemphasized in two ways: As applied to the facts in Purcell it seems
speculative and self-defeating, and in general, it is afforded undue
weight vis-a-vis other electoral legitimacy concerns. Perhaps most con-

sequentially, the decision does not instruct courts on how they should
27 DAVID GANS, AM. CONST. SOC'Y, THE ROBERTS COURT, THE SHADOw DOCKET,
AND THE UNRAVELING OF VOTING RIGHTS REMEDIES 16 (2020), https://www.acslaw.org/

wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Purcell-Voting-Rights-IB-Final-Version.pdf (arguing that the
shadow docket produces rushed decisions which, in the context of Purcell and progeny,
have limited the federal courts' power "to fashion voting rights remedies close to Election
Day" in spite of precedent indicating otherwise).
28 Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court's Enigmatic "Shadow Docket," Explained, Vox,
(Aug. 11, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/8/11/21356913/supreme-courtshadow-docket-jail-asylum-covid-immigrants-sonia-sotomayor-bares-ahlman (quoting
William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court's Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY

1 (2015)).
29 Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARv. L.

REv. 123, 125 (2019).
30 See, e.g., Hasen, Untimely Death, supra note 3, at 34 ("[G]iven the controversial

empirical assumptions contained in the opinion, it is likely that at least the more liberal
Justices on the Court did not have time to fully digest the significance and potential
negative interpretations of the opinion."); see also infra notes 73-74 and accompanying
text (emphasizing that Purcell's concern with preventing confusion should not be
considered an end in itself but rather a means to promote democratic legitimacy).

31 Stephanopoulos, supra note 14 (referencing federal election laws to suggest that
forty-five to sixty days might be a reasonable period).
32 Derek T. Muller, Justice Ginsburg Turns the "Purcell Principle" Upside Down in
Wisconsin

Primary

Case,

EXCESS

OF

DEMOCRACY

(Apr.

6,

2020),

https://

excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2020/4/justice-ginsburg-turns-the-purcell-principle-upsidedown-in-wisconsin-primary-case.
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balance these concerns, including the weight that the election's proximity should be given in deciding whether to grant the requested
relief. 33 Alongside these failures is another lapse: The Court misapprehended the potential for Purcell to be exploited by partisans, while
simultaneously forcing even well-intentioned judges to abdicate their
role in ensuring electoral legitimacy at the risk of being reversed much
closer to elections. In short, the Court's lack of forethought resulted in
its promulgation of a principle that is not only vague and lacks coherence, but also risks exacerbating the problems it was meant to
address-all the while posing injury to the most vulnerable voters.
A.

Unremarkable Principles

Given its brevity and the absence of firm commands, it is difficult
to extract "hard" rules from the Purcell opinion. However, if the decision could be said to offer any, there are three contenders. The first is
that courts should proceed cautiously when deciding whether to intervene in the lead-up to an election. 34 The second is a call for reviewing
courts to afford deference to the decisions of lower courts. 35 And the

third is a general reminder to judges of the importance of showing
their work. 36 To this end, the decision is unremarkable. These propositions represent well-established or commonsensical principles of
jurisprudence.

From the case itself, its subsequent application, and the scholarly
attention it has garnered, the first rule seems to be the opinion's primary takeaway. 37 Yet the instruction to exercise prudence as the election nears is hardly novel. In cases past, courts-including the

Supreme Court itself-have intoned this cautionary verse. Take
Reynolds v. Sims, for example. 38 Reynolds is among the most foundational election law cases, particularly for its promulgation of the "one
33 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 14 (noting that even the dissents from Purcell's

jurisprudence which have explored the timing of judicial intervention "have still been
skimpy opinions that didn't purport to offer a comprehensive analytical framework"); see
also discussion infra Section II.C.1.

34 See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006) (per curiam) ("Court orders affecting
elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and
consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.").

35 See id. at 5 ("It was still necessary, as a procedural matter, for the Court of Appeals
to give deference to the discretion of the District Court.").
36 See id. ("There has been no explanation given by the Court of Appeals showing the
ruling and findings of the District Court to be incorrect.").
37 See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 13, at 427-28 (noting how Justice Alito suggested the
Purcell principle was "the apparent common thread" in a series of seemingly contradictory
Supreme Court orders around the 2014 election).
38 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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person, one vote" principle. 3 9 Less frequently cited, however, is the
Court's guidance about election-eve orders. Having deemed
Alabama's state legislative districts unconstitutionally malapportioned, but facing an upcoming election, 40 the Reynolds Court
acknowledged its position between the metaphorical rock and hard
place. In the not-so-famous part of the notorious opinion, the Justices
offered guidance to courts that, due to a time crunch, faced the pros-

pect of conducting an election pursuant to an unlawful electoral
scheme: "In awarding or withholding immediate relief, a court ...
should consider the proximity of a forthcoming election and the
mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and should act and
rely upon general equitable principles." 4 1 Even as it instructed courts
to act "sufficiently early to permit the holding of elections pursuant to

[their remedial] plan[s] without great difficulty," 4 2 the Court recognized that under "certain circumstances, such as where an impending
election is imminent and a State's election machinery is already in

progress, equitable considerations might justify a court in withholding
the granting of immediately effective relief." 43
Nor was Reynolds a one-off. The Court has weighed in on other
cases where the political calendar presented the real possibility of
sanctioning a contest that suffered from illegal elements.44 While the

outcomes have varied, the guidance was invariable: Proceed with caution. 45 The notion that courts should intervene in an upcoming elec-

tion only grudgingly is the legal equivalent of "measure twice, cut
39 See id. at 557-61.

40 Id. at 584-85.
41 Id. at 585.
42 Id. at 586.
43 Id. at 585; see also Hasen, supra note 13, at 442 & n.64 (citing Reynolds as an

example of a 1960s redistricting case that sought to avoid disrupting voter expectations by
making its changes effective the next election cycle).

44 See, e.g., Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 113 (1971) (affirming the district court's decision
in choosing "what it considered the lesser of two evils," that "elections [would] be
conducted under the legislature's" unconstitutionally malapportioned electoral plan

because the election was looming and the new census figures would require a new district
map); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 396 U.S. 1064, 1064-65 (1970) (denying a motion to vacate a
stay of the district court order establishing a new legislative map during an election year,
thus permitting an election to proceed under a scheme found to be unconstitutional);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1968) (requiring Ohio "to permit the Independent
Party to remain on the Ballot," but not the Socialist Labor Party, because the Socialist
Labor Party had been denied relief for requesting it "several days" after the Independent
Party was granted identical relief, and that later relief could not "be granted without
serious disruption of election process"); Toombs v. Fortson, 384 U.S. 210 (1966) (affirming
the district court's requirement of new districts), aff'g 241 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
45 See, e.g., Ely, 403 U.S. at 114-15 ("[T]he District Court should make very sure that
the 1972 elections are held under a constitutionally adequate apportionment plan."

(emphasis added)).
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once." It is both sensible and well-established. In this regard, Purcell
is not an outlier, but the norm, for the wariness it admonishes offers
little beyond what courts already understood and, hopefully, heeded.

As for Purcell's other two precepts, they seem even more elementary. The Court's instruction to defer to district court discretion is
unexceptional, grounded in equitable principles as well as sound
policy. 46 From a doctrinal perspective, deference is warranted because
a decision "to deny as well as grant injunctive relief" is an "exercise of
equitable discretion," and "the proper standard for appellate review is
whether the District Court abused its discretion." 47 Deference is like-

wise appropriate as a matter of policy, particularly given the trial
court's role as the primary factfinder and its proximity to the case specifics. 48 A presumption of honoring the judgment of the court that
spent considerable time with the matter promotes the accuracy and
fairness that comes from close and careful review. To be clear, a
"reviewing court may decide . . . that the district court misinterpreted
the evidence" 49 presented, thereby "find[ing] it necessary to refashion

the remedies." 50 But such an assessment is very much in line with the
expectation. This combination-that the doctrine governing injunctions largely rests decisionmaking with the trial court and the oftrepeated, widely accepted claim that presiding judges are best positioned to weigh the facts at hand-renders Purcell's guidance about
respect for lower court discretion quite unremarkable.
Nor is the admonition that lower courts should show their work
remarkable either. In Purcell, the Court expressed a modicum of sympathy for the circuit panel, which was put in the unenviable position of
reviewing a lower court order bereft of facts and analysis. 51 Nevertheless, the opinion chastised the panel for "failing to provide any factual
findings or indeed any reasoning of its own," thus leaving the Justices
similarly ill-situated and forcing them to evaluate a "bare order." 5 2
46 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (per curiam) (explaining the necessity "as a
procedural matter, for the Court of Appeals to give deference to the discretion of the
District Court").

47 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982); see also eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) ("The decision to grant or deny
permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable
on appeal for abuse of discretion.").
48 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 C AUF. L.

REV. 524, 566 (1982) ("The standard of review of trial court decisions on injunctive relief is
typically .. . the abuse of discretion," which "reflects an awareness that the trial judge may

be in the best position to assess the likelihood of future violations.").
49 Id.
50 Id. (quoting SEC v. Advance Growth Cap. Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir. 1972)).
51 See Purcell, 549 U.S. at 3.
52 Id. at 5.
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But this, too, is a basic tenet of judicial decisionmaking, established
both in procedure and in underlying normative principles that guide
judicial reasoning. First off, the Federal Rules demand as much, at

least from district courts. Rule 52(a) requires courts to "state the findings and conclusions that support" their decisions to grant or deny
interlocutory injunctive relief.53 Indeed, Purcell cites that rule. 54 And
while there is "no universal reason-giving requirement" that binds all
federal judges, 55 there is a reasonable expectation for them to provide
their rationale "when the absence of reasons would entirely frustrate
review. "56

Even more, though, the notion that courts should articulate the
reasons for their decisions is critically rooted in normative principles
of institutional legitimacy and efficacy. Summary orders inherently
lack "the transparency that is fundamental to the credibility of the
courts," 57 and judges, who operate in a uniquely inaccessible and
unaccountable manner, should be sensitive to that.58 Additionally, in
failing to detail their rationale or provide specificity, courts issuing
summary orders offer minimal guidance to the parties to the action,
affected outsiders, and (if they are afforded precedential weight) similarly situated persons. 59 This decreases the overall utility of summary

orders. To be sure, courts can-and frequently do-issue them, and
may even have good (albeit unstated) reasons for doing so.60 Yet in
practice, such orders tend to relate to housekeeping matters that
require little explanation, routine questions that are easily dispensed
53

FED. R. Cv. P. 52(a)(2).

54 Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5.
55 Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative
Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 483, 495 (2015).
56 Id. at 534; id. at 536 ("In short, so long as the record available to the reviewing court
enables some form of review, there is no reason-giving requirement bearing on federal
judges.").

57

Ira P. Robbins, Hiding Behind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and Per

Curiam Opinions, 86 TUL. L. REv. 1197, 1211 (2012).
58 See id. at 1208 ("[W]hen laws originate in the judiciary they have the potential to be
more opaque because the process by which they are created is not directly accessible. The
merit of the transparency of the procedure is just as vital as the integrity of the resulting
law itself."); see also Hasen, supra note 13, at 462 (describing the benefits of courts
providing reasoned justifications for their decisions).
59 See N.Y. Cty. Laws.' Ass'n, Summary Orders: Report of Joint Subcommittee on Use
of Summary Orders by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 62

BROOK. L. REv. 785, 791 (1996) ("Summary orders by their nature contain only an
abbreviated discussion of the facts of the particular case and a conclusory discussion of the
applicable law.").
60 See Cohen, supra note 55, at 514 (arguing that in addition to "efficiency reasons,"
there are also "institutional and cognitive reasons" for summary decisionmaking).
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with, and affirmances of lower courts' reasoned holdings. 61 Otherwise,
judgments lacking explanation of the facts and legal reasoning should
be a rarity, as they become indistinguishable from mere fiat and
threaten the institutional credibility of the courts. 62 Even if there is no

firm positive requirement, courts should, as a normative matter, be in
the habit of publicly justifying their rulings-especially when the
underlying matter concerns the democratic process. To the extent that
Purcell calls for this, it states something rather obvious.
In terms of actual instruction, Purcell is far from remarkable. The

notion that courts should generally restrain any impulse to intercede
when an election is looming is as commonplace as it is advisable. This
is even more so the case for the suggestions that reviewing courts
ought to show deference to lower courts, and that all courts should

show their work. Aside from lumping three garden-variety instructions together in a single case, then, it is unclear what Purcell's
holding adds.
B.

Voter Confusion: An Overemphasized and Underinclusive
Principle

Beyond its obvious instructions, Purcell's only other major
takeaway seems to be the need for courts to be on their guard for
voter confusion. 63 But the heavy emphasis on this concern was unwarranted in two respects. In general, the Court overstated voter confusion as a problem vis-a-vis other democratic legitimacy concerns, and
61 See N.Y. Cnty. Laws.' Ass'n, supra note 59, at 790 ("[S]ummary orders are
overwhelmingly used to affirm lower court decisions.").
62 See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Judges
deliberate in private but issue public decisions after public arguments based on public
records. The political branches of government claim legitimacy by election, judges by
reason. Any step that withdraws an element of the judicial process from public view makes
the ensuing decision look more like fiat .... "); see also Adam Liptak, Missing from
Supreme Court's Election Cases: Reasons for Its Rulings, N.Y. TIMnEs (Oct. 26, 2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/us/supreme-court-election-cases.html ("If courts don't
have to defend their decisions, then they're just acts of will, of power. They're not even
pretending to be legal decisions.").
63 Scholars who have analyzed this aspect of Purcell have thoughtfully suggested that
the anti-confusion rationale should apply to election administrators in addition to voters,

given that court orders issued late in the election cycle might also impact their work. See,
e.g., Hasen, supra note 13, at 441 (arguing that "electoral chaos can ensue when election
officials face conflicting court orders on how to run an election" because "changing
election procedures just before the election can be difficult," especially if it requires
retraining "cadres of poll worker volunteers ... on new rules or procedures close to the
election"); Stephanopoulos, supra note 14 ("Beyond the possibility of voter confusion,
then, courts contemplating action close to election day should evaluate the risk of
administrator error."). While the potential for judicial decisions to result in election
administrator confusion is a reasonable consideration, the Purcell decision itself never
raised it.
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on the facts of the case, the Court exaggerated the potential for it to
manifest. At the same time, its treatment of voter confusion was
underinclusive. The Court focused on the potential for court-initiated

voter confusion to the exclusion of politician-caused confusion, something that is at least equally problematic. Nowhere did the Court
explain its decision to overemphasize the anti-confusion rationale on
one hand, and ignore it on the other, revealing one of Purcell's most

critical shortcomings.
In Purcell, the Court asserted that "[c]ourt orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter con-

fusion," a "risk [that] will increase" as Election Day nears.64 The
order's phrasing suggests that the concern about voter confusion was

intricately-almost intrinsically-tied to the timing of the election.
The goal is not just to minimize confusion, but to minimize it immediately before the election when it may have the greatest impact. Perhaps erroneous and conflicting messages about the election may be
corrected, but corrections are of little use if made at the last minute
because they may not be conveyed broadly before voters make essential election-related decisions.
The Court's focus on confusion is unsurprising. Minimizing con-

fusion has long been accepted as a legitimate state objective in election law cases. 65 But while the goal of promoting stability in the leadup to elections is reasonable, Purcell does not explain that there is a

broader concern driving the focus on confusion: democratic legitimacy. Confusion might lead to mistakes in voting or decreased participation. 66 Either result, if sizable enough, would detract from the
election's authoritativeness because it would not reflect the actual will
of the people. 67 As such, preventing confusion should not be thought
64

Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006) (per curiam).

65 See, e.g., Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 228-29 (1989)

(acknowledging the state's legitimate interest in protecting "voters from confusion and ...
fostering an informed electorate," but invalidating the prohibition on primary
endorsements for limiting information which might further that goal).
66 See Yelena Dzhanova, Election Officials Fear Voting Changes Will Confuse Voters in
November, CNBC (July 11, 2020, 9:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/11/election-

officials-fear-changes-could-confuse-voters-in-november.html ("Voting officials are
concerned that drastic changes to election procedures in response to the coronavirus will
confuse voters in November."); Danielle Root & Aadam Barclay, Voter Suppression
During the 2018 Midterm Elections, CmR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 20, 2018, 9:03 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2018/11/20/461296/voter-

suppression-2018-midterm-elections

(describing the sources and effects of voter

confusion).
67 See James A. Gardner, Democratic Legitimacy Under Conditions of Severely
Depressed Voter Turnout, 2020 U. CHi. L. REV. ONLINE 24, 31 (discussing how

disenfranchisement efforts may threaten the legitimacy of electoral results).
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of as an end in itself. Rather it should be considered a means to preserving democratic legitimacy.
If the overarching concern is the election's legitimacy, then confu-

sion stemming from rule uncertainty should not be the only-or even
the principal-worry. Elections can be administered in a variety of
ways that might not be confusing but would nevertheless be deemed
illegitimate. For example, a law categorically barring Black Americans
from participating would cause little confusion. Yet an election conducted under such conditions would be unconstitutional, 68 and its
results would lack legitimacy. 69 In a less extreme (and more likely)

example, if eligible voters were discouraged or wholly prevented from
participating due to intimidation, the threat of violence, or for fear of
their health, the legitimacy of the outcome could likewise be cast in
doubt. 70 Undoubtedly, confusion leading to depressed voter turnout is
problematic. But that is because a mandate from an election in which
all who are entitled to participate and want to participate do not par-

ticipate due to some outside force-be it confusion stemming from
rule uncertainty, discriminatory rules, or conditions that pose a risk to

one's safety and well-being-can hardly be called a mandate at all. 71
Despite the Court's failure to discuss and properly situate voter
confusion within the broader context of democratic legitimacy, Purcell
implied elsewhere that these other concerns should not be subordinated. Before suggesting that sustaining the injunction could result in
voter confusion, the Court raised a separate concern: "Voter fraud

drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our government," and those "who fear their legitimate votes

will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised."

72

The suggestion here-that preventing the voter ID law from taking

effect might lead to depressed turnout because it would discourage
segments of the electorate afraid of illegal vote dilution from partici-

68 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV (guaranteeing the right to vote to citizens regardless of
race).
69 See Gardner, supra note 67, at 30 ("[E]lectoral legitimacy ... is often considered to
be threatened when abstention is involuntary and selective-when it is the result, that is to
say, of discrimination.").
70 See, e.g., Eugene D. Mazo, Voting During a Pandemic, 100 B.U. L. REV. ONLINE
283, 292 (2020) (arguing that it is unclear how the various states' mail-in and absentee
ballot rules will impact who votes but if the result is a "severe downward pressure on
turnout" it "may pose a threat to the democratic legitimacy of whoever wins").
71 See Gardner, supra note 67, at 25 (noting that "if turnout is unusually low due to

involuntary exclusion of large numbers of voters," then "the risks to democratic legitimacy
...

are disturbingly high").

72 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam).
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pating-is as incredible as it is audacious. 73 The assertion is also noteworthy because, if taken seriously, it could have significant
ramifications for legal analysis. 74 Putting that aside, however, the
statement endeavors to show that confusion is not the only threat to
an election's legitimacy. Other concerns, like fear-induced diminished
participation, may be just as substantial or even more so.75 Purcell's
shift in focus from the risk of rule uncertainty to lower participation
stemming from the perception of fraud highlights the existence of
other election concerns.
Where Purcell did address the potential for voter confusion, it
overemphasized its risk of undermining the legitimacy of the election.
In reviewing the district court ruling, the appeals court was obligated
to consider, among other factors, those "specific to election cases," the

opinion read.76 "Court orders affecting elections, especially conflicting
73 Professor Hasen cogently explains why this is a strange assertion that deserves little,
if any, credence. First, the Court assumes, without any evidence, that people "are deterred
from voting out of fear that their legitimately cast votes will be diluted by the votes of
those committing voter fraud." Hasen, Untimely Death, supra note 3, at 35. Second, the
claim ignores what evidence does exist, which "seems to suggest that voter identification
requirements are more likely to depress turnout than to increase it." Id. at 36.

Furthermore, the statement minimizes (or perhaps flatly disregards) the decrease in Black
"voter confidence in the electoral process" stemming from voter ID laws. Id. And finally,
and most bizarrely, the Court's suggestion that "it is appropriate to balance feelings of

disenfranchisement against actual disenfranchisement" signals that such "misperceptions"

can "trump the fundamental right to vote." Id.
74 The 2016 cycle, and even more the 2020 cycle, illustrate the grave flaw in the Court's
reasoning. Following Donald Trump's numerous, unsubstantiated claims of widespread and
outcome determinative voter fraud, there has been an increase in the perception of many
that their votes have been diluted. See Mark Jurkowitz, Republicans Who Relied on Trump
for News More Concerned than Other Republicans About Election Fraud, PEw RscH. CR.

(Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/11/republicans-who-reliedon- trump-for-news-more-concerned-than-other-republicans-about-election-fraud. Of
course, the mere perception of illegal dilution, without more, cannot countenance a
measure that would impair the fundamental right to vote for others. But under the Court's

rationale, it might be justified. While not the focus of this Article, much-and perhaps not
enough-can be said about the problematic nature of this claim in Purcell.
75 The text of the three "Enforcement Acts" that sought to enforce the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments are prime examples of Congress's reaction to fear-induced

diminished participation; these acts reflect a desire to ensure democratic legitimacy by
protecting African Americans from election-motivated violence and intimidation rooted in
pervasive notions of white supremacy. See Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Act of
Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433; Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871); see also
James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing Popular Sovereignty
Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 189, 237-38 (1990) ("A law

forbidding such exclusionary practices can be seen as a reflection of legislative concern that
officials elected only by a self-selected subgroup of the people-in this case, whites-are
not truly representative, and are therefore of possibly suspect legitimacy."); id. at 236-45
(discussing the Enforcement Acts as measures to enhance democratic legitimacy because
of their aim of ensuring the consent of the governed).
76 Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4.
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orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent
incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election draws closer,
that risk will increase." 7 7 But it is worth inquiring how much this general statement pertains to the facts of Purcell. Despite the Court's suggestion, it is far from clear that enjoining the enforcement of a voter
ID law would cause confusion-or at least the type that would depress
turnout. While halting or eliminating a barrier to voting could confound some, there is no good reason to believe that it would confuse
voters in a way that would lead to their disenfranchisement, voluntary
or otherwise. 78 If anything, blocking the law in these circumstanceseven at the last minute-would stand to increase turnout, as eligible
voters lacking the necessary identification would have greater incen-

tive to go to the polls.79 By failing to recognize the unlikelihood that
rule uncertainty would result in disenfranchisement, the Purcell Court

gave undue weight to the voter confusion rationale.
If the Court was truly concerned about eleventh-hour voter con-

fusion, it would have condemned the imposition of any last-minute
election rule changes. But instead, it made clear that Purcell applies to
the judiciary only.80 Assume, as the Court must, that parties look to

the latest regulations to prepare for elections. Each successive rule
change invites the potential for greater uncertainty. However, this
potential confusion depends on the substantive nature of the new

rule-the differential between it and the prior rule-and the ability to
communicate the change. It is wholly independent of the actor
imposing the rule change. For all its focus on confusion, then, Purcell
is woefully underinclusive. As a result, it suffers from a serious

problem: the "final mover."
The "final mover" phenomenon can be framed in basic economic

terms. While the upsides to being the first in a market are more
obvious, there are also advantages to entering later, namely information and innovation. Because later actors have the benefit of the
leader's hindsight, they can "identify a superior but overlooked
77 Id. at 4-5.

78 See Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the
Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in

the Challenge to

Voter Identification

Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1739 (2008) (summarizing their findings that fears
of voter fraud "while held by a sizable share of the population, do not have any
relationship to a [survey] respondent's likelihood of intending to vote or turning out to
vote").
79 See Michael D. Gilbert, The Problem of Voter Fraud, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 739,

747-50 (2015) (summarizing the empirical research on how voter ID laws impact voter
turnout and concluding that the results are mixed).
80 See Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4-5 ("Court orders affecting elections, especially conflicting
orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away

from the polls." (emphasis added)).
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product position" or "undercut the pioneer on prices," enabling them
to "beat[] the pioneer at its own game." 81 Our constitutional system is

structured with checks and balances such that politicians should act as
pioneers and courts, exercising judicial review, act as final movers.
However, Purcell frustrates this arrangement: By establishing a date
after which courts must refrain from intervening, it also creates a

window during which nonjudicial actors can freely engage in
unchecked election rulemaking. Politicians can always be the final
movers. Aware of as much, they and their allied election officials will
have a perverse incentive to game the system by altering the rules at
the judicial intervention cutoff point. 82 They might adopt new laws
and regulations designed to give them an electoral advantage, and

even ones that would be deemed unlawful.8 3 Beyond the problem of
cravenly self-interested and potentially illegal conduct, those electioneve changes could also result in voter confusion. There are, to be sure,

legitimate reasons-constitutional, prudential, institutional, and otherwise-for the principle to restrain the court only.84 But by doing so,
Purcell opens society up to potentially graver problems. It invites strategic manipulation of election rules-and even the imposition of
illegal ones-by nonjudicial actors, while failing to address the very
potential for last-minute confusion that it purportedly seeks to
combat.
The other problem implicates the judiciary alone. Purcell's
emphasis on confusion alone, irrespective of its potential risk to voter

turnout and electoral legitimacy, puts the squeeze on judges by manu81 Venkatesh Shankar, Gregory S. Carpenter & Lakshman Krishnamurthi, Late Mover
Advantage: How Innovative Late Entrants Outsell Pioneers, 35 J. MKTG. RsCH. 54, 54
(1998); see also Bill Green, Uber, Lyft, and Facebook All Share 1 Thing in Common-And
It's Not What You Want for Your Business: Being First Isn't Always Best, INc. (Aug. 28,

2017), https://www.inc.com/bill-green/want-to-be-the-next-uber-lyft-or-facebook-youmigh.html ("Pioneers usually die of bug bites and dysentery.").
82 See David H. Gans, How John Roberts Quietly Made It Harder to Vote, SLATE (Oct.
2, 2020, 2:46 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/10/how-john-roberts-made-itharder-to-vote.html (arguing that the Purcell principle "effectively reduces the right to
vote to a second-class right and inevitably harms marginalized and less-powerful citizens"
because "[i]f courts announce that they will essentially never intervene, they invite partisan

manipulation of our democracy").
83 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing a hypothetical law categorically

barring Black Americans from voting).
84 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators."); Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election
Wrongs, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 265, 295 (2007) ("Courts are justifiably wary of interfering
in the outcome of the political process, both to protect themselves and to protect the

democratically elected branches. To the maximum extent possible, the people, not the
courts, should choose their representatives.").
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facturing a catch-22 situation in which the court, as an institution, is
bound to lose. Judges, like political actors, have an incentive to weigh
in on challenges before the election. Even absent political motivations, they are likely to want to halt or displace an illegal rule or, at a
minimum, make a determination as to its potential impact. Unlike
political actors, however, courts are in a unique competition with time;

they must try to intercede late enough for the matter to be ripe and to
issue a ruling on a fully developed and carefully reviewed record, but
early enough to meet Purcell's murky deadline.85 If they do intervene,

their rulings are subject to being revised or displaced on appeal by a
court that faces the same time pressures and whose order will, by

necessity, issue even closer to the election. Whether correct or not,
these rulings progressively create greater potential for confusion.
When the litigation eventually comes up against Purcell's red line,

courts will be faced with a choice: review the claims of illegality and
address the meritorious ones, or abstain to avoid confusion, thus sanctioning the potentially unlawful status quo. Going with the former

option to mitigate problematic rules in advance of the election risks
reversal for intervening too late in the calendar. Choosing the latter
only frustrates the purpose and structure of the judiciary, amounting

to an abdication of the job.
Purcell demonstrated this scenario. Even before the Supreme
Court issued its limited guidance, the district and appeals courts
sought to settle the dispute provisionally by giving instructions in
advance of the election to ensure that it would be governed by rules
that were both clear and lawful. But if each ruling is even more destabilizing than the one that precedes it, the Supreme Court will always
create the greatest potential for confusion because it will inevitably
86
render its decision closer to the election than any other court.
According to Purcell's rationale, one should expect the Court to be
the most reluctant to weigh in. Yet when presented with the option to

intervene or abstain, the Court chose the former; it issued its order to
reverse the appeals court on October 20-some two weeks after the
panel's decision, and two weeks before the election. The Court ration-

alized its decision paradoxically, arguing that its vacatur was both "[i]n
85 See Rick Hasen, Supreme Court: Election Litigation That Doesn't Come Too Early
Comes Too Late, ELECTION L. BLOG (Apr. 1, 2021, 6:47 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/

?p=12141 4 (making an April's Fool's Day "joke" which highlights the timing dilemma that
Purcell creates for election rule challenges).
86 See Developments in the Law: Voting and Democracy, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1127, 1191

(2006) ("These deadlines also mean that deterrence will be amplified at each stage of
judicial review: if a lower court is deterred from ordering a change in election procedure,
an appellate court is even more likely to be deterred because its review will occur even
closer to an election.").
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view of the impending election," and due to "the necessity for clear
guidance to the State of Arizona." 8 7 Despite its framing of the situation as one in which its hands were tied, in vacating the appellate decision the Court made a conscious choice-even if a difficult one-to
defend the structure and purpose of the judiciary as an institution
even at the risk of causing late breaking voter confusion. From its
position atop the judicial branch, the Court can be the final mover.
That is, it can always choose to preserve the appellate structure and
referee the political process even moments before the election. But in

exercising that right, it must concede that its decision will contribute
to the very confusion that Purcell purportedly seeks to minimize.
Underlying the Court's singular focus on voter confusion is, presumably, a sincere aim to secure broad participation and electoral
legitimacy. But Purcell is uniquely troubling for neglecting to align its
emphasis on confusion with this broader goal. Some "policies are incapable of causing voter confusion," and not all confusion, even late in
the election cycle, creates the risk of disenfranchisement or illegitimacy.88 Likewise, there are an array of things other than confusion
that can lower voter turnout, and an even greater number of things
that can delegitimize an election-all of which can arise in the lead-up
to voting. Even assuming that confusion should be a court's primary
concern, however, Purcell's narrow focus on the principle comes at a
cost. The knowledge of a judicial cutoff date creates bad incentives for
nonjudicial actors with the greatest stake in the election's outcome,
while weighing most heavily on the courts that we expect to mitigate
flaws in the political process. In its preoccupation with confusion,
Purcell "assume[s] that this probability is high," where it "should
assess it based on the best available evidence." 8 9 This blind obsession
with an utterly speculative claim is unwarranted, as it creates perverse
incentives and results in action that is contradictory and self-defeating.
C.

Phantom Principles

What one does not say can be just as important as what one does.
So too with Purcell. Here I focus on two phantom principles, things
that the Court should have said or accounted for but did not. First,
Purcell offers no clear indication as to how its concerns should be considered in a court's equitable analysis. Second, it provides no reason to
counter the perception-and perhaps reality-that the Court is falling
prey to the partisan voting wars. Taken together, these phantom prin87 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (per curiam).

88

Stephanopoulos, supra note 14.

89

Id.
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ciples give Purcell a malleable quality that promotes inconsistency and
unfairness in emergency election suits.

Weight and Fit

1.

Purcell suggests that lower courts should consider the timing of
the election before issuing an opinion that changes the rules. Wholly
lacking from the decision, however, is guidance as to where the election's proximity should factor into courts' analyses and the weight that

it should be afforded. Given the scholarly attention that this lapse has
garnered, it is fair to say it is the most consequential of Purcell's
phantom principles.90 While there are various ways that courts can
take Purcell into account, the absence of clear instruction is problematic as it can result in inconsistency among lower courts, unfairness to

the parties, and a waste of judicial resources. Indeed, Purcell's failure
to clarify this point of ambiguity only exacerbates the confusion that

stems from this anti-confusion principle.
Litigants in election and nonelection suits alike regularly request
(and oppose) equitable relief, in the form of injunctions and stays, to

alter (or maintain) the status quo. While injunctions and stays differ, 9 1
"the mechanisms . .. share similar standards,"92 with both tests taking
into account the same, well-established factors. 93 Courts determine
their appropriateness by evaluating the likelihood that the applicant
will succeed on the merits of the case, the potential for harm to

ensue-and the extent of that harm-should relief be granted or
denied, and the public interests served by an order.94 But "[a]ll of this
90

See, e.g., GANS, supra note 27, at 3 (commenting that Purcell resulted in a rule that

"prevents courts from stopping late-breaking acts of voter suppression"); Hasen, supra
note 13, at 443-44 (arguing that courts should consider factors in addition to timing when
"deciding whether or not to issue orders affecting elections in the period close to the
election"); Stephanopoulos, supra note 14 ("[C]ourts shouldn't hesitate to step in if their
remedies won't baffle voters . . . and couldn't feasibly have been imposed sooner.").
91 See Portia Pedro, Stays, 106 CAF. L. REV. 869, 890-92 (2018) (pointing out the
following points of difference between injunctions and stays: functionality, the amount of
justification they require, the burden they place on the court and parties, their procedural
posture).
92 Id. at 890.

93 See id. at 889 ("Although the procedural posture of stays pending appeal differs
significantly from that of preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders, federal
courts treat these three procedural mechanisms similarly.").
94 See id. at 890 n.121 (comparing the injunction standards set out in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) with the stay standards set out in Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)); see also Hasen, supra note 13, at 435 ("Although the
Supreme Court standards for (1) granting a stay, (2) vacating a stay, and (3) issuing an
injunction differ somewhat . . . the standards all weigh the same issues of likelihood of
success on the merits, irreparable injury to the parties, and the public interest.").
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complex balancing was missing in Purcell,"9 5 even as the Court chided
the appeals court for failing to consider the potential for confusion
given the election's proximity. 96 Because the Court elided these considerations and offered a generalized pronouncement, it did not provide specificity as to how-or whether-its ruling comports with the

standard equitable analyses.
Having decided that the merits question is close or weighs in
favor of the applicant for equitable relief, there are a few ways courts
might reasonably contend with Purcell's concern with voter confusion
when an election is looming. First, it might fit in the part of the anal-

ysis that considers the balance of hardships or the harm to the parties.
The applicant's burden to persuade the court that "the real-world

implications" of allowing the law to take effect would "be of serious
and irreversible consequence," 97 in this context, would require a
showing that postelection remedies are insufficient or unavailable.
That likely means convincing the court that unjustified disenfranchise-

ment would ensue because "there can be no do-over and no redress"
for depriving the fundamental right to vote after the election has
occurred. 98 Courts could then account for Purcell in their fact-based
inquiry into countervailing harms. In addition to any harm that the

defendants raise on behalf of themselves and interested parties, judges
can consider the election's proximity; the court could evaluate the
likelihood that an order would lead to voter confusion and consequent
disenfranchisement. If the agency's professed harms (combined with
the decreased voter turnout due to confusion) outweigh the disenfranchisement of the applicant, then the agency wins on this prong,
and the court could be justified in permitting the rule to remain in
place during the pendency of the election.
Alternatively, Purcell could figure into the public interest prong.

The Court might find that, on balance, the attendant hardships favor
the plaintiff. Only then would it consider the impact of a late-stage

court intervention on the public, specifically the potential for voter
confusion to ensue. In fact, this is where Purcell most logically fits,
and taking its concerns into account here would also be consistent
with

the

"standard

formulation"

for

equitable

relief

because

95 Hasen, supra note 13, at 443.
96 See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (per curiam) (vacating the Court of
Appeals ruling while noting that "[a]s an election draws closer, [risk of voter confusion]
will increase").
97 Pedro, supra note 91.
98 Id. at 881 (quoting Fla. Democratic Party v. Detzner, No. 16CV607, 2016 WL
6090943, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 16 2016)); see also Hasen, Untimely Death, supra note 3, at

37 ("If a . .. law is indeed disenfranchising, there is likely no effective post-election remedy
to restore the right to vote.").
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preventing widespread voter confusion immediately prior to an election is inherently in the public interest. 9 9 While Purcell'slanguage suggests that this is where the concern should be factored in,100 the
inconsistency among lower courts applying it belies any contention

that its writing is a model of clarity. 10 1 Because "[t]he public interest
has never been understood as a factor that can justify an injunction

when the balance of equities does not," 102 a court finding that a rule
change would result in hardship to the public as interested parties
might never even address the public interests at stake. In either case,

courts should be attuned to the public interest in making election-eve
rulings, "balanc[ing] the disenfranchisement if they do interfere ... against the disenfranchisement if they don't ... ."103 If a court

finds that the "latter is larger than the former, the judicial calculus
should tilt in favor of enjoining or otherwise amending the illegal
policy."1 0 4
Of course, determining where Purcell fits into the equitable anal-

ysis presumes that it actually fits into the analysis at all. Courts might
consider Purcell as a distinct consideration, perhaps creating "a pre05
The
sumption against . . . judicial intervention near an election."1
or
rebuttable
was
presumption
the
question, then, would be whether
rebuttable
irrebuttable. However, merely establishing Purcell as a
presumption offers little guidance without determining the strength of
that presumption, which ought to relate to the probability or univer-

sality of its underlying rationale.1 06 Given that the potential for both
confusion and disenfranchisement can vary based on the rule, it would
99 Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REv. 485,

552 n.156 (2010) (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
100 See 549 U.S. at 4 ("[T]he Court of Appeals was required to weigh, in addition to the
harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction .... " (emphasis added));
see also Hasen, supra note 13, at 441 ("These special [confusion] concerns in election cases
should have counted toward the public interest factor .... ").
101 Compare, e.g., Priorities USA v. Nessel, 978 F.3d 976, 985 n.3 (6th Cir. 2020)
(considering Purcell in the public interest prong), with N.J. Press Ass'n v. Guadagno, No.

12-06353, 2012 WL 5498019, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 13, 2012) (considering Purcell in the harms
analysis).
102 Goldstein, supra note 99, at 522 n.156, 533 n.196 ("[T]he conventional formulation of
the public interest factor allows the public interest to be used to restrain the issuance of an
injunction, not to justify it.").
103 Stephanopoulos, supra note 14.
104

Id.

105

Id.

See Steven C. Salop, An Enquiry Meet for the Case: Decision Theory, Presumptions,
and Evidentiary Burdens in Formulating Antitrust Legal Standards 13 (Nov. 6, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3068157 ("The presumptions would
apply to categories of conduct with common elements that are predictors of the likely
outcome [and] . . . would be based on logic, economic analysis, both theoretical and
empirical, and judicial experience.").
106
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seem better to avoid a general presumption against judicial intervention and, instead, resolve the matter through factual inquiry based on
the standard equitable analysis. Establishing Purcell as an irrebuttable
presumption would, in effect, bar judicial intervention entirely. But a
categorical bar to relief because of an impending election would
thwart the purpose of having equitable remedies in the first instance.
It would render inutile the very "prophylactic remedy" at the courts'
disposal that could put wrongfully disenfranchised voters in "the
rightful position"-a "consensus ... goal of equitable relief"-in the
time preceding the election. 107 Such a rule not only fails to reflect
what courts do, 10 8 it also would be normatively bad for reasons that
purportedly justified the Court's intervention in prior election
cases. 10 9
Without guidance as to how Purcell should be factored into their

decisions, courts are left to their own devices. This is problematic for
several reasons. First, it creates the potential for disparate treatment.
Courts might be presented with the same set of facts yet, depending
on how they believe Purcell should be considered, reach different outcomes. Identical claims might support relief if Purcell's concerns
factor into the public interest considerations, but not if they establish
a strong or irrefutable presumption. Second, how courts weigh Purcell
will influence government officials' decisionmaking in designing and
enacting election measures. Whereas a fact-intensive balancing of
harms and the public interest would promote rigorous pre-enactment

analyses, a stronger presumption of court abstention gives officials
little incentive to assess the legality and impact of their policy proposals due to the low risk that they will be enjoined. Finally, clarifying
how Purcell should be taken into account would also aid judicial decisionmaking regarding resource allocation. If Purcell is just one consideration in the equitable analysis, courts might prioritize election cases

on their docket in the pre-election period. If Purcell functions as a
virtual or absolute bar to late intervention, then it would make sense,
from the perspective of judicial economy, for courts to afford these
cases no priority because their ruling will not have an impact on how

the election is administered.
107 Tracy A. Thomas, UnderstandingProphylactic Remedies Through the Looking Glass
of Bush v. Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 389 n.274 (2002).
108 See Huefner, supra note 84, at 286 ("Courts are understandably more reluctant to

order an injunction on the eve or in the middle of an election than well before it.
Nevertheless, many examples exist of judicial intervention in an election already
underway.").
109 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 108 (2000) (per curiam) ("The press of time does
not diminish the constitutional concern.").
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Purcell might be factored into the traditional equitable relief tests
or it might stand for the presumption against judicial intervention. In

either case, courts faced with requests for relief later in the election
cycle should undertake fact-based inquiries into challenged election

rules, assessing things like the probability that altering them will
foment voter confusion-and to what extent-as well as the likely
impact on turnout. But where Purcell fits into their analyses and the
weight afforded to it matters. It has relevance for doctrinal consistency and party fairness, and shapes how lawmakers and courts conduct themselves in the pre-election period. The obvious importance of

these matters that implicate the right to vote counsels that they be
clearly set out well in advance of the election. This is yet another area
in which Purcell failed.
2.

Impartiality and Nonpartisanship

Finally are the issues of impartiality and nonpartisanship. These
traits are essential to the judiciary, as fairness to the litigants and the

legitimacy of the outcome depend on the absence of any relevant
bias.11 0 Moreover, the increasingly politicized nature of the judicial
selection process and the hyperpartisan environment in which judges
operate makes it especially important for those overseeing electionrelated disputes to remain above the fray and signal as such."' In this
regard, Purcell falls short. Despite its brevity, and the fact that the

lower courts had split on the case, the Purcell opinion reads as unbalanced. While the opinion never applies the test for evaluating the constitutionality of election laws, its flippant discussion of the state's
interest and the potential burdens-key considerations in the testreverses the order in which they are traditionally analyzed. Then,

instead of offering a fresh and thoughtful legal discussion of those
interests, the Court advances an argument that appears inherently
partisan. And as for Purcell's language, it too is skewed, in both
quality and quantity. Whereas the Court could have drafted the
opinion carefully and evenly to set the tone for lower courts and
lawmakers alike, it seems to have used the case to send smoke signals

about how it would approach future voting rights cases. In doing so, it
missed an opportunity to assuage critics of one of their most potent,
yet predictable, critiques.
110 See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of JudicialImpartiality,65 FLA. L. REV.

493, 511 (2014) (discussing the "parties" and "the public" as among the "audiences" or
beneficiaries of judicial impartiality).
111 See generally Neal Devins & Allison Orr Larsen, Weaponizing En Banc, 96 N.Y.U.

L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (highlighting the increasing partisanship in federal judiciary
appointments and its effect on presidential election dispute outcomes).
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After laying out the facts of the case in the first part of the order,

the Court moves on to section two, which is seemingly devoted to setting out the legal standards and analysis. Instead of opening the section with a broad principle or rule statement that captures the

importance of elections, however, the section begins by articulating
the state's "compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its elec-

tion process," citing Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Committee.112 Immediately after, it dives into a discussion of the perils

of voter fraud. This is deeply troubling for a couple reasons.
First, the opinion represents a departure from the traditional

order of analysis for election regulations. Cases that challenge laws as
infringing on the right to vote are resolved in accordance with the

Anderson-Burdick balancing test. Under that test, a court "must first
consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected . . . . It then must identify and evaluate the precise

interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden
imposed by its rule."113 Only then will a court be "in a position to
decide" the matter. 1 4 This ordering is important. By addressing the
encumbrances on the franchise first, determining if they are "severe"
or "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions," courts can then
decide the appropriate standard of scrutiny and, ultimately, whether
the law's burdens are justified.11 5 The order also makes sense practically, as it puts the voter's claims before what is, in effect, the govern-

ment's defense. Purcell fails to mention Anderson-Burdick, which
itself is problematic because Anderson-Burdick-not Eu-articulates
the rule that governs the merits dispute. As a consequence, when the

Court briefly mentions the relevant considerations, it inverts the order
in which they should be analyzed. This partial engagement seems to

expose the Court's thinking on the merits case, notwithstanding its
disclaimer that it takes no view on it.116 To the extent that the Court

was going to openly ruminate under the rubric of the prevailing stan112 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam) (citing Eu v. S.F. Cnty.
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989)).
113 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (emphasis added); Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (explaining that under the Anderson test, "the regulation
must be 'narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance"' (quoting

Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992))).
114 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. Notably in both cases that make up the standard, the
Court considers the claims before the state's justification.
115 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 289).
116 See Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5 ("We underscore that we express no opinion here on the

correct disposition . .. of the appeals from the District Court's September 11 order or on
the ultimate resolution of these cases.").

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

PURCELL IN PANDEMIC

October 2021]

967

dard, it should have been consistent for the sake of impartiality and
the perception thereof.

Far from a harmless lapse, the reordering only adds to what
amounts to Purcell'spattern of unevenness. Indeed, by beginning with
the line from Eu, and specifically the word "integrity," the Court adds
a subtle, yet unmistakable, partisan veneer to its analysis. 117 As

written, the section leaves readers with the impression that
"preventing voter fraud" is the paramount concern for ensuring election integrity. 118 This hardly seems impartial, especially in a case
where the plaintiffs raise their own election integrity concern: disenfranchisement. But the Court does not frame the plaintiffs' claim in
terms of election integrity; it never suggests that the reason the state
should be attuned to disenfranchisement is that it, too, could undermine the integrity of the democratic process. That is because the word
"integrity" has deep partisan connotations.1 19 It is meant to imbue the
voter identification and other measures with an air of respectability,
even in the face of claims that they disenfranchise segments of the
electorate who tend to vote for Democrats-most notably, people of

color and the poor. 120 Where the Court does suggest that disenfranchisement might fit under the umbrella of election integrity concerns, it is only in reference to the disenfranchisement that some
might feel in the absence of voter identification measures. 121 In its
embrace of the phrase in this context, and its failure to disabuse the
notion that state-driven disenfranchisement is also a matter of election
integrity, the Court's opening salvo plays into the partisanship that
Id. at 4 (quoting Eu, 489 U.S. at 231).
Id. at 4.
119 See, e.g., VERNON J. EHLERS, FEDERAL ELECTION INTEGRITY AcT OF 2006, H.R.
REP. No. 109-666, at 3-4 (2006) (arguing that "[t]he purpose of ... the Federal Election
Integrity Act of 2006 is to protect the franchise and reduce the opportunities for, and
incidence of, vote fraud," and highlighting a photo identification requirement as "a basic
and necessary step to preserve the integrity of the voting process" from fraud and double
117
118

voting); Peter Kirsanow, Where's the Integrity?, NAT'L REv. (Sept. 25, 2006, 2:00 PM),
(describing the
https://www.nationalreview.com/2006/09/wheres-integrity-peter-kirsanow

assertion from political opponents that there is "little evidence of the voter fraud the
[Federal Election Integrity] Act seeks to remedy or prevent" as "absurd"). Notably, the

Court issued its opinion in Purcell as Congress was actively considering the Federal
Election Integrity Act of 2006, and the legislative record makes several mentions of the
Arizona voting law, with Republicans suggesting it is a laudable example of efforts to
ensure integrity.
120 See generally Fresh Air, Trump's Election Integrity Commission Could Have a
'Chilling Effect' on Voting Rights, NPR (May 17, 2017, 1:47 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/
05/17/528769195/trumps-election-integrity-commission-could-have-a-chilling-effect-on-

voting-righ (discussing disenfranchisement caused by strict voter ID-among otherrequirements, which particularly impact people of color, as well as older and younger
people).
121 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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surrounds the debate over election regulations in general, and in particular, those like the law at issue in Purcell.
Finally, if the ordering and the framing is not telling enough, the
attention given to the claims and how they are characterized should
be. The sheer amount of ink spilled over the specter of voter fraud
relative to the potential for disenfranchisement suggests that the
former was always driving the opinion. Only after its five-sentence

ode to "election integrity" does the Court glibly mention voters'
"strong interest" in the franchise. 122 Beyond these quantitative differences, there are also qualitative ones. First is the fact that the state's

interest in election integrity is bolstered with two powerful, fullsentence quotations from caselaw, including one from the muchrevered Reynolds v. Sims. 123 The plaintiffs' interest in voting, in con124
trast, is worth the lesser effort of extracting just three words.

Second is the Court's broader terminology choices. Whereas the
Court employs direct and strident language to present the problems
associated with voter fraud-it "breeds distrust," undermines
"[c]onfidence," and discourages "honest citizens"-the few words it
dedicates to disenfranchisement, like "much debated," "might," and
"would caution . . . careful consideration," are passive, vapid, and
utterly feeble. 125
The partisan system of election administration in the United

States, particularly in the current climate of extreme political polarization, can take a toll on Americans' faith in the election results. 126
"Emergency election litigation" only contributes to this problem, as it

"has the added peril of being fraught with potential partisanship-or
at least the appearance thereof." 127 This effect is even greater when
Purcell, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006).
123 Id. ("[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight
of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise." (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964))); see also id. ("A State
indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process."
(quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989))).
124 Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4 ("Countering the State's compelling interest in preventing
voter fraud is the plaintiffs' strong interest in exercising the 'fundamental political right' to
vote." (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972))).
122

125 Id. at 4.
126 See Chad Vickery & Bailey Dinman, Should We Experiment with Election

Administrationin the US?, COMPAR. JURIST (Sept. 19, 2020), https://comparativejurist.org/
2020/09/19/should-we-experiment-with-election-administration-in-the-u-s ("[T]he structure
of election administration .. . is often politicized; in 24 states, the elected secretary of state
... serves as the chief election official. As political divisions have grown more severe in the
United States, this partisan leadership structure is likely contributing to declining trust in
election outcomes.").
127 Edward Foley, Symposium: The Particular Perils of Emergency Election Cases,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 23, 2020, 5:28 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/symposium-
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the litigation concerns "hot-button issues like voter ID that have a

pronounced partisan valence." 128 Where Purcell, an emergency appeal
concerning a voter identification law, could have tempered the concerns over partisanship, it exacerbated them. The order's inverted
analysis, embrace of the partisan dichotomy of "integrity," and quantitative and qualitative language differences belie its claim that the
Court had "no opinion here on the correct disposition" of the

merits. 129 Where the Court should issue opinions that inspire presiding judges to aspire to their branch's highest values, Purcell is laden
with text and subtext that reeks of partiality and even partisanship. In
issuing a slapdash opinion-bereft of cogent arguments and lacking a

clearly articulated standard to guide itself and the judiciary-the
Court constructs a hollow shell. By drafting it so one-sidedly, it cues
other courts to mimic its behavior and opens the judiciary to predict-

able attacks.
III
PANDEMIC AS PROOF

Since Purcell was issued a decade and a half ago, it has been cited
in many federal judicial opinions. 130 Insofar as Purcell might offer
greater insight into how courts have apprehended the threadbare principles, a more comprehensive examination of its application could be

edifying. Short of that, however, the Court's treatment of Purcell
during the 2020 election cycle arguably provides the best context for

discerning its meaning and scope. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic
"[t]he 2020 election may go down as one of the most administratively
challenging elections in American history." 131 It spawned a wave of
lawsuits across the country alleging that certain regulations impaired
the right to vote in the pandemic even if they might not have constithe-particular-perils-of-emergency-election-cases (arguing that Justices may easily become
"overridden" by political instinct in rendering emergency election opinions due to the
litigation's "fast-moving" nature).
128 Tokaji, supra note 12, at 1067.
129 Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5.
130 See Election L. Ohio State, The Purcell Principle: A Presumption Against LastMinute Changes to Election Procedures, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/

election-law-explainers/the-purcell-principle-a-presumption-against-last-minute-changesto-election-procedures (last visited June 24, 2021) (explaining how Purcell has been used in
decisions upholding a Texas voter ID law and overruling a Wisconsin district court order
which extended the absentee ballot submission deadline in response to the COVID-19
pandemic).
131 CHARLES STEWART III, MIT ELECTION DATA + SCI. LAB, HOw WE VOTED IN 2020:
A FIRST LOOK AT THE SURVEY OF THE PERFORMANCE OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 34

(2020), https://electionlab.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2020-12/How-we-voted-in-2020-vOl.pdf
(surveying voter experiences and behaviors in national elections).
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tuted burdens during a normal election cycle. 132 In response, defendants repeatedly invoked Purcell to support their contention that
courts lacked authority to mandate changes. Given the unprecedented
and extraordinary nature of the crisis-stricken environment, it seemed
well-suited for testing the extent of Purcell's wariness of awarding
extraordinary relief. 133 That is to say, if any exceptions or limiting
principles apply to Purcell, the extreme conditions of conducting an

election during a global health crisis should have revealed them. Thus,
the period from February through November-from the earliest

reported U.S. COVID-19 cases to the final casting of votes-offers
not just a conveniently limited window, but also an eminently relevant
one. The opinions rendered during that period should be illuminating.
And in many regards, they were. 134 An examination of the

Supreme Court's orders revealed an overemphasis on voter confusion.
As in Purcell, the rule changes at issue in the pandemic cases created
minimal prospects for actual confusion-or at least the sort that would

decrease voter turnout. Thus, the Court's repeated references to its
anti-confusion

principle amounted

to little more than rhetoric.

Furthemore, despite Purcell's admonition for judges to both show
their work and afford deference to lower courts, 135 the Court seemed
to dispense with these concerns, showing no real interest in the district

and appellate courts' decisionmaking rationale. Nor did the Court
provide any specific guidance to clarify the weight that Purcell should
be given or where the election's proximity fits in the analysis for equitable relief. Nevertheless, with limited exception, the Court's decisions

suggest that Purcell constitutes a categorical ban on judicial intervention on the eve of an election. The Court showed even less concern for
the perception of partisanship, as the bulk of its decisions were made
along predictable partisan lines. And while the Court provided a small
measure of doctrinal clarity, suggesting that Purcell applies only to

federal courts, the change in the Court's composition renders that proposition tenuous. In sum, Purcell in the pandemic both succeeded and
failed: It successfully maintained its reputation as jurisprudential
132 See Richard L. Hasen, Three Pathologies of American Voting Rights Illuminated by
the COVID-19 Pandemic, and How to Treat and Cure Them, 19 ELECTION L.J. 263, 276

(2020) (summarizing the core legal theory of these cases to be that a law "ordinarily might
appear to be a minor burden on voters, such as returning absentee ballots by a set
deadline, becomes a severe burden when voters," due to the pandemic, "cannot vote safely
in person and cannot receive an absentee ballot to return by the set deadline").
133 See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The great and primary use of
a court of equity is to give relief in extraordinary cases.").
134 It is important to bear in mind that the assessments are based on inferences from a
handful of short per curiam decisions, dissents, and orders lists.
135 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (per curiam).
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muddle, yet failed to meet the moment and the needs of American
democracy in crisis.
A.

Confusion

In case after case, the Court made no attempt to go beyond
paying mere lip service to voter confusion, Purcell's primary concern.

Not only did the Court repeatedly fail to probe lower court findings to
evaluate the actual likelihood of confusion and consequent disenfranchisement, but much of its own action increased the potential for

last-minute confusion in a way that could aggrandize the disenfranchisement problem. With the core justification for Purcell neither
rigorously examined nor thoughtfully applied to the specific facts of
each case, the confusion rationale seems like a speculative front.
The Republican National Committee v. Democratic National

Committee decision is illustrative. 136 In that case, the Supreme Court
granted an application to stay a district court order, affirmed in part
by the Seventh Circuit, extending Wisconsin's absentee ballot receipt
deadline to accommodate voting during the pandemic.1 37 The case is
notable for many reasons. It was the Court's first decision related to

the 2020 election cycle. Likewise, it was decided during COVID-19's
initial surge-when little was known about the virus beyond its deadliness-which forced many states, including Wisconsin, to take

extraordinary measures like imposing stay at home orders.138 And
importantly, Republican National Committee v. Democratic National
Committee relied heavily on Purcell. The case very much set the stage

for pandemic-related election litigation at the Supreme Court.
In its order, the Court cited "the wisdom of the Purcell principle," asserting that its purpose was to prevent "this kind of judicially
created confusion."1 39 To support its contention, the Court highlighted
the fact that the district court instructed state election officials to
refrain from releasing election results until the new ballot receipt date,
questioning the order's efficacy.140 But it is a stretch to describe this as

support. Despite its passing reference, the Court failed to explain the
precise nature of "this kind" of confusion that would be brought on by
136 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per curiam).
137

Id. at 1208.

138 See Amanda Moreland et al., Timing of State and Territorial COVID-19 Stay-atHome Orders and Changes in Population Movement-United States, March 1-May 31,

2020, 69 MORmD=rY & MORTALrTY WKLY. REP. 1198, 1200 fig.1 (2020) (providing the
type and duration of COVID-19 stay-at-home orders by state from March through May
2020).
139 Republican Nat'l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207.
140

Id.
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the district court order.1 4 1 While the lower court's action may have
been extraordinary, it was hardly confusing. Instead of inquiring into
whether voter confusion would materialize, including the type of confusion that would discourage voters from participating, the Court
simply proclaimed it.142 Had the Court actually assessed the likelihood
that the district court order would result in voter confusion-or better
yet, further confusion1 43-it might have found that voters were very
much tracking the latest election news and that the chances were quite

low. And in the off chance that greater confusion would have ensued,
it is unlikely that an extended ballot deadline would have resulted in
greater disenfranchisement. In fact, the opposite would have been
more likely because voters would have had more time and more reliable information to help them navigate the changes.

Assuming that Purcell'sconcern with confusion should have been
the priority in that test case, the Court's action in Republican National
Committee v. Democratic National Committee served only to frustrate
the stated objective of limiting it. That is because when the Court

intervened, it upended the status quo-and did so even closer to the
election.1" Prior to the stay, voters were ostensibly preparing for the
election to proceed in accordance with the instructions in the lower

court's, circuit-affirmed decision. Upon receiving word of the
Supreme Court's late-breaking order, however, voters had to
scramble to alter their plans. The irony of this was not lost on Justice
Ginsburg who, writing for the dissent, noted that the Court's last-

minute rule change was "sure to confound election officials and
voters."14 5 Indeed, if Purcell truly "counseled hesitation when the
District Court acted" five days before the primary election, as the per
curiam order claimed, then the Supreme Court's "intervention" on the
day before the election was "all the more inappropriate."1"6
The confusion charade was perhaps even worse in Raysor v.
DeSantis, where the Court was presented with facts that raised a

serious prospect of voter confusion but failed to take action to mitiId.
142 The Court suggested that information leaks about the earlier returns would
compromise the election because voters who had yet to cast their ballots might alter their
behavior. Id. at 1207-08. However, this focus on the lower court's inability to prevent
strategic late voting only supports my larger point that Purcell overemphasizes voter
confusion and underemphasizes other important values.
143 Due to partisan infighting among the state's political leadership, the election took on
an on-again, off-again character. See infra Section III.E.
144 The decision was issued on April 6, 2020, just one day before the election was
scheduled to take place. Republican Nat'l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1206.
145 Id. at 1210 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 1210-11.
141
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gate it.147 In declining to vacate the Eleventh Circuit's stay of an
injunction, Raysor let a rule go into effect that the district court found

to be in violation of three separate provisions of the Constitution and
likened to a poll tax.1 48 After a trial, the district court enjoined a

Florida law that rendered former felons ineligible to vote until they
paid any "legal financial obligations" owed, which included a range of
costs and fees aimed at "funding the government in general or specific
government functions."

14 9

Importantly, the district court's order did

not alter the existing state of affairs. On the contrary, it sought to
make permanent the preliminary injunction that had been both in

effect for ten months and previously affirmed by the Circuit. 150 So
when the Circuit stayed the injunction on July 1-just nineteen days
before the deadline to register for the state's primary-that decision
altered the status quo.151 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit created the
real potential for voter confusion just weeks before the August 18 primary election.
Even worse, however, was Florida's admission: Under its current

system, it could not verify whether former felons had satisfied their
debt or inform them how much remained outstanding.15 2 As a conse147 140 S. Ct. 2600 (2020).
148 See Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1203, 1231-34, 1250 (N.D. Fla., 2020)
(holding that a Florida rule which conditioned voting for citizens with felony convictions
on payments of fees constituted an unconstitutional tax on voting in contravention of the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, furthering an Eleventh Circuit injunction of a rule which
conditioned ex-felon voting on payments of amounts exceeding the citizen's ability to pay
in Jones v. Governor of Florida, 950 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 2020)). All of this, of course,
stemmed from the earlier action by state lawmakers to limit the effect of Amendment 4,
the change to the state's constitution that requires formerly incarcerated Floridians to have
their right to vote restored after "completion of all terms of sentence." Id. at 1205. After
the constitutional ballot initiative succeeded-garnering the support of nearly two-thirds of
Florida voters-the Republican-led legislature responded by adopting legislation defining
the financial obligations as part of one's term, effectively narrowing the class of formerly
incarcerated persons who would be re-enfranchised. Id. at 1206. That legislation
preconditioning the right to vote on the payment of the fees was the basis for this litigation.
Id. at 1203-04. For general background on Florida's voting law and the district court's
order, see Steven Lemongello & Mark Skoneki, Federal Judge Rules Florida Ex-Felons
Can Vote Despite Fines or Fees, ORLANDO SENTINEL (May 26, 2020), https://
www.orlandosentinel.com/politics/os-ne-amendment-4-judge-ruling-sunday-20200524h5axxddum5do5mayjf3xlzqmge-story.html.
149 Jones, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 1206-07.
150 Raysor, 140 S. Ct. at 2603 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Precisely because the District
Court's decision in Jones II tracked the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Jones I, the stay
upends the legal status quo nearly a year after the preliminary injunction took effect.").
151 See Jones v. Governor of Fla., No. 20-12003-AA, 2020 WL 4012843, at *1 (11th Cir.
July 1, 2020).
152 Raysor, 140 S. Ct. at 2601 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Based on the State's
estimates . . . the District Court noted that Florida officials would need about six years to
determine how much (if anything) currently registered voters (to say nothing of those who
seek to register) must pay to vote.").
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quence, the tens of thousands of Floridians who had registered in reliance on the district and circuit courts' opinions not only faced
uncertainty about their legal eligibility to vote, but the prospect of
criminal prosecution if they guessed wrong. 153 The Supreme Court
disregarded this patently confusing scenario and offered no justification. As Justice Sotomayor wrote in her dissent, the Court was
presented "with an appellate court stay that disrupt[ed] a legal status

quo and risk[ed] immense disfranchisement-a situation that Purcell
sought to avoid."1

54

Yet rather than using the opportunity to remedy a

truly Kafkaesque situation, "the Court balk[ed]."

55

As in Republican

National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, the Court in

Raysor employed the empty rhetoric of confusion without bothering
to substantiate it, only to intervene at the last minute in a way that
56
stood to increase actual confusion and disenfranchisement.1

The stated motivation for the Purcell decision was the goal of
minimizing confusion in the lead-up to elections to ensure maximum
voter turnout. Lower courts applying Purcell attempted to honor this

objective in the way one would expect: by acknowledging the realities
of the world, evaluating the specific facts of the cases before them,
analyzing the law, and tailoring remedies designed to promote sta-

bility and maximum voter participation. The Supreme Court made no
comparable effort. When presented with the cases on appeal, it
offered superficial praise for Purcell-if it offered anything at allwhile declining to engage in a manner consistent with its underlying
rationale. In fact, the Court's action ran counter to Purcell's core
rationale, only aggrandizing the problem of last-minute confusion in
an environment already beset with pandemic-induced chaos. When
put to the test, the Court's concern about confusion rings hollow.

More problematically, the empty obsession with the speculative
problem seems deceitful.
B.

Deference and TransparentDecisionmaking

Beyond raising the specter of confusion while only aggrandizing

its prospects, the Court's pandemic orders ignored Purcell's other
admonitions. Indeed, on at least two occasions the Court gave short
153 Id. at 2603.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 In yet another standout case, the Court carved out an exception to its ruling, an

implicit acknowledgement that the remedy would have increased confusion. See Andino v.
Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 9-10 (2020) (staying an order enjoining a South Carolina "witness
requirement" for absentee ballots, "except to the extent that any ballots cast before this

stay issues and received within two days of this order may not be rejected for failing to
comply" with the requirement).
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shrift to its earlier statements that the lower court opinions warrant

deference and that reviewing courts should be transparent in their
decisionmaking. Whereas in Purcell, the Court reversed the Ninth

Circuit for failing to adhere to these principles, it showed indifference
when the appeals courts flouted them during the 2020 contests. Even
more, the Court itself flagrantly disregarded them.
Once again, Raysor illustrates this practice. As previously noted,
the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in the Florida case, staying the

district court's injunction with less than three weeks to the close of
registration for the primary. 157 While some of the legal arguments may
be complex, the larger takeaway is simple: Despite the fact that the
district court conducted an eight-day trial and painstakingly articulated its rationale for the injunction in a 125-page opinion, 158 the

appeals court halted the trial court's decision in a brief summary order
that failed to provide any reasoningfor its action.159 The Circuit thus
violated Purcell in not one, but two regards. First, it ignored the

instruction for reviewing courts "to give deference to the discretion of
the District Court." 160 At the same time, the Circuit offered "no
explanation .. . showing the ruling and findings of the District Court

to be incorrect." 16 1 The Supreme Court then issued its own summary
order, also failing to articulate its rationale,1 62 while letting the
Eleventh Circuit's "bare order" remain in effect.1 63 These failures
were, as the dissent wrote, "the precise error[s] this Court corrected in
Purcell."1 64 Thus, in its own scant order, the Supreme Court validated
the Circuit's decision to flout its earlier instructions while ignoring the

thousands of Floridians left in limbo.
The Court took similar action in Merrill v. People First of
Alabama165 except with two key differences: It vacated an injunction
that was supported by both the district and appellate courts. Following
an eleven-day trial, the district court ruled that the Alabama Secretary
of State's decision to ban curbside voting during the pandemic-in a
state where poll workers were powerless to "turn away voters who do
157 See supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.

158 See Raysor, 140 S. Ct. at 2601 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he District Court
entered a permanent injunction and issued its factual findings and legal conclusions in a

125-page opinion.").
159 See Jones v. Governor of Fla., No. 20-12003-AA, 2020 WL 4012843, at *1 (11th Cir.
July 1, 2020).
160 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (per curiam).
161 Raysor, 140 S. Ct. at 2602 (citing Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5).

162 See id. at 2600 (containing no reasoning or substance in the majority opinion).
163 Id. at 2602 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
164 Id.
165 141 S. Ct. 25 (2020).
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not wear masks, or turn away voters who have a known case of

COVID-19"-violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the
Americans with Disabilities Act.166 The district court laid out its ratio167 connale in an opinion that spanned over one hundred pages,
cluding that prohibiting the practice was unlawful because it "imposes
a significant burden on [Plaintiffs'] voting rights," which "the State's
interests ... do not justify."168 Accordingly, it enjoined the state from
enforcing the Secretary's policy, thereby permitting willing counties to
allow the accommodation. On review, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
69
this part of the ruling, thus declining to vacate the injunction.1 However, neither the district court opinion nor the appeals court's partial
affirmance was enough to appease the Court. Issuing yet another per
curiam order without any reasoning, the Court stayed the injunction

less than two weeks before the general election.1 70

In Raysor, the Supreme Court ruled against the only court that

offered support for its finding that the regulation at issue was unconstitutional. In Merrill, it reversed the judgment of two courts, despite
their agreement that the state's policy was unlawful. In each case, the

Court dispensed with its admonition that deference is due to the findings of lower courts and that reviewing courts should be transparent in
their decisionmaking. By failing to explain its own departure from
these principles, the Court left two of the clearest, most commonsensical parts of Purcell by the wayside. Yet this seemed of no moment to
the Court which, instead, left us with the task of trying to reconcile
utterly inconsistent rulings. Where the Court could have exercised dis-

cipline and respect for its earlier ruling, it chose the contrary. It opted
for a display of unbridled power.
C.

Weight and Fit

Even as it ignored Purcell'smost intelligible elements, the Court
spent precious little time elucidating the decision's most opaque one:

how much weight judges should give to the election's proximity. This
is most telling from the fact that, despite issuing a succession of opinions relying on Purcell, the Court offered no guidance as to how its

considerations fit into the analysis for equitable relief. Without any
clarification, lower courts and the Supreme Court itself were left to
166
167

People First of Ala. v. Merrill, 491 F. Supp. 3d, 1076, 1160 (N.D. Ala. 2020).
See id,

168 Id. at 1154.

169 People First of Ala. v. Sec'y of State for Ala., 815 F. App'x 505, 516 (11th Cir. 2020).
170 Merrill v. People First of Ala., 141 S. Ct. 25, 25 (2020) (granting the stay on October
21, 2020).
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debate the extent to which Purcell constrains their ability to remedy
unlawful measures in the lead-up to elections.

As the pandemic continued to take its toll, the Court issued
nearly a dozen orders in cases that clearly implicated Purcell. In some
of them, the justices referenced Purcell explicitly, whether in the per
curiam order,171 concurrence,1 72 or dissent.1 73 In all of them, Purcell
was raised in the decisions of the courts below. Yet in none of these
circumstances did the Court openly engage with equitable relief fac-

tors, and only in concurring and dissenting opinions was AndersonBurdick ever mentioned. 174 Therefore, the answer to whether Purcell

creates a consideration or a presumption remains inconclusive. And as
a result, courts will continue to muddle through the legal morass.
And yet, if one were to read between the lines-the few lines that
the Court bothered to include in its spate of decisions-one would not
be faulted for concluding that the real answer is that "it does not

matter." Gauging from the rulings in the overwhelming majority of
the Court's pandemic orders, where and how Purcell fits technically is
of little consequence because it seems to operate as a near categorical
bar to judicial intervention. Irrespective of the gravity of the constitutional violation alleged, and despite the lack of explanation from
reviewing courts that failed to show deference to the lower court, the
Court halted virtually all judicial changes to election laws in advance
of the election.1 75
This was made apparent at the pandemic's onset, when things

were most uncertain, as Purcell kept lower courts from trying to make
up for a surge in absentee requests and backlogs in the mail that kept
voters from receiving their ballots.1 76 It was made apparent again later
in the summer, when a partisan-motivated state law and a summary
order created voter confusion, and Purcell permitted residents to
wallow in limbo at the risk of criminal prosecution.1 77 Purcell not only
171

See, e.g., Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207

(2020) (per curiam).
172 See, e.g., Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 10 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring);

Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 31-32 (2020) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring).
173 See, e.g., Raysor v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600, 2600, 2602-03 (2020) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting); Merrill v. People First, 141 S. Ct. 25, 27 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
174 See, e.g., Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 33, 35
(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); id. at 41 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
175 The most notable exception to this pattern was due to a distinction between actions
by federal judges and state actors. See infra Section III.D.
176 See Republican Nat'l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1206-07 (citing the "wisdom of the Purcell

principle" in staying the district court's injunction requiring "the State to count absentee
ballots postmarked after April 7, 2020").
177 See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
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prevented the relaxation of absentee ballot witness requirements that
78
clearly violated the medical community's call for social distancing,1
but also kept local governments from voluntarily using curbside voting
to minimize the risk of viral transmission to their most vulnerable
residents. 179 In case after case, the Court swatted pleas of desperate
voters, discrediting itself and its earlier claim that "[t]he press of time
180
does not diminish the constitutional concern."

The Supreme Court has had fourteen years to make sense of
Purcell. It also had advanced warning, at least as early as April 2020,
that the judiciary would be barraged with claims of unconstitutional

infringements on the right to vote.1 81 In repeated instances leading up
to important 2020 election deadlines, the Court shirked the opportunity-its responsibility-to elucidate a murky principle of its own creation. Instead, it opted to provide courts with no "more guidance than
182
At the same
... an occasional sentence or two in its stay rulings."
time, the Court was almost unvarying in its unwillingness to grapple

with regulations that created obstacles for Americans seeking to exercise the franchise during a global pandemic. Regardless of the magnitude of the harm they might pose to the parties or the public, and
irrespective of their tendency to "result in voter confusion" or give

8 3 election laws
voters "incentive to remain away from the polls,"'
appeared immune to challenge, making lawsuits an exercise in futility.
This supreme obliqueness notwithstanding, over the course of the

pandemic Purcell'strue meaning became all too clear. The suggestion
that "courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of

an election" is now an implicit, yet sharp, rebuke of any jurist who
hazards to alleviate constitutional injury even in the most extraordinary circumstances.184
178 See Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 10 (2020) (granting a stay in part of the district
court's preliminary injunction enjoining South Carolina's absentee ballot witness
requirement).
179 See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.

180 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 108 (2000) (per curiam).
181 See, e.g., Pam Fessler, Coronavirus May Reshape Who Votes and How in the 2020
9 882

/

Election, NPR (Apr. 10, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/10/83105
2
coronavirus-may-reshape-who-votes-and-how-in-the- 020-election (describing how the
pandemic caused disruptions as early as April).
182 Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 2020) (Rovner,
J., dissenting).
183 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006) (per curiam).
184 Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020)
(per curiam); see also Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Election Litigation in the Time of the
Pandemic, 2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 18, 22 ("Absent from this reprimand was any

recognition that what courts should 'ordinarily' do might not be what they should do when
a pandemic is raging.").
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Limits to Federal Courts

The Court did explicitly clarify one point: Purcell applies to federal courts only. While in the original case, the Court reviewed the
decision of federal district and appellate courts, the order mentioned
"[c]ourt orders affecting elections" generally. 18 5 But in three pandemic cases, the Court offered the clearest indication that Purcell only

binds the federal judiciary.1 86 Still, even this is tenuous. Given the
change in the Court's composition, it is far from certain that this limitation will remain in effect over the long term.
The first order, in Republican Party of Pennsylvania v.

Boockvar,187 was issued on October 19, 2020. In a single sentence, the
Court denied the application for an emergency stay of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision mandating that ballots
received within three days of Election Day be counted if they were
not clearly postmarked after Election Day.1 88 Importantly, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court rendered its judgment based on its interpretation of the Pennsylvania constitution and the state election
code.1 89 Equally important is that the denial was the result of a 4-4

deadlock, with Chief Justice Roberts siding with the Court's three
liberals.

The following week, the Court rejected another application. This
time, however, it was asked to vacate the Seventh Circuit's stay of a
federal district court order that, among other things, extended the
deadline in Wisconsin for receiving absentee ballots by six days.190
The district court's decision to enjoin the state's regular deadline was

based on the burden it posed on the right to vote under the U.S.
Constitution.191 In siding with the Court's conservatives, Chief Justice
Roberts issued a concurrence explaining his reasoning for permitting
the rule change in Pennsylvania to remain in effect while disallowing it
in Wisconsin. "While the Pennsylvania applications implicated the
authority of state courts to apply their own constitutions to election
185 Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4.
186 To be clear, the Court has suggested this in earlier cases. See, e.g., Republican Nat'l

Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207 ("This Court has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal
courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election."); Republican
Nat'l Comm. v. Common Cause R.I., 141 S. Ct. 206, 206 (2020) ("[H]ere the state election
officials support the challenged decree, and no state official has expressed opposition.").
187 141 S. Ct. 643 (2020).
188 Id. at 643 ("Application for stay presented to Justice Alito and by him referred to the
Court denied.").
189 See Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 352 (Pa. 2020).
190 Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 28 (2020).
191 See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 488 F. Supp. 3d 776, 799 (W.D. Wis.
2020) (discussing the Anderson-Burdick balancing test "to determine whether an election

law unconstitutionally burdens a citizen's right to vote").
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regulations, this case involves federal intrusion on state lawmaking
processes. Different bodies of law and different precedents govern
these two situations .... "192
Two days later, the Court issued its final pre-election order in
Moore v. Circosta,193 which rejected yet another emergency application. The Court was asked to vacate the Fourth Circuit's decision to let
stand a state court consent decree in which the North Carolina state
board of elections agreed to extend the ballot receipt deadline by six
days. Chief Justice Roberts sided with the Court's liberals to sustain
the Circuit's opinion, thereby leaving the state court-approved deadline extension intact. The Court issued its order over a noted dissent
by conservatives, and despite an explicit statement from the Circuit's
dissenting judges arguing that Purcell should also apply to state court

and agency conduct as well.194 Taken together, the three orders issued
in the last weeks before the election provide the greatest measure of
clarity about the Purcell principle. Where election eve rule changes
are made at the behest of states-whether by state courts or other
government officials-federal courts may not intercede.
This clarification is tenuous, however. The decision in Boockvar
195
At the time of its issuwas split, with four justices on either side.

ance, then-Judge Barrett was a week from being confirmed as

196
And though she was a sitting justice when
Associate Justice Barrett.

the Court issued its ruling in Moore v. Circosta (the other case seeking
review of state officials' conduct), the order noted that Justice Barrett
had not taken part in the decision. Therefore, the pivotal orders establishing Purcell as a constraint only on federal courts do not have the
clear backing of a majority. While it is unclear how Justice Barrett

would have decided, there is greater reason to believe that she would
97
have sided with the Court's conservative wing than with its liberals.1
192

Democratic Nat'l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 28 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

141 S. Ct. 46 (2020).
Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93, 116 (4th Cir. 2020) (Wilkinson, J. and Agee, J.,
dissenting) ("But there is no principled reason why this [Purcell] rule should not apply
193
194

against interferences by state courts and agencies.").

195 Republican Party v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 643, 643 (2020) ("Justice Thomas, Justice
Alito, Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Kavanaugh would grant the application.").
196 See Amy Howe, Barrett Confirmed as 115th Justice, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 26, 2020,

11:34 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/barrett-confirmed-as-115th-justice

(noting

that Justice Barrett was confirmed on October 26, 2020, a week after Boockvar was

decided).
197

It is possible that Justice Barrett would adhere to the strain of federalism that drove

the Chief Justice to side with the liberals in Boockvar and Circosta. Given her originalist

approach to constitutional interpretation, however, it seems more likely that she would
have agreed with the conservatives, who would reject rule changes based on Purcell and
their deep embrace of the independent state legislative doctrine. See Moore, 141 S. Ct. at

48 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that in addition to "invit[ing] confusion," the changes
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Until the Court is faced with another election-eve controversy, the

single greatest point of certainty about Purcell will remain shaky.
E.

Partisanship

While reaching the correct outcome in a case is essential,
"[e]nsuring that the public perceives and accepts a remedy as fair is
equally important to the legitimacy of an election remedy." 198 Courts
should be particularly sensitive to this notion when their decisions rely
on a case like Purcell, which fails to establish a clear standard and,
thus, gives politically driven courts the opportunity to use it in furtherance of their politically desired ends. This possibility, in turn, increases
the risk of public hostility due to the perception that courts are, in

fact, acting in this manner. Because a last-minute "ruling in favor of
the . . . candidate" of the same party affiliation risks "placing the
Court firmly in the middle of the political morass, rather than above
it,"199 each instance in which Purcell is invoked to resolve a case along
partisan lines represents a blow to the Court's legitimacy. Neverthe-

less, the Court ruled in this precise way time and again during the
pandemic litigation, portraying it as unconcerned with the legitimacy
of its rulings in the eyes of the public.
It should have been obvious to the Court from the very start that

the public might perceive its decisions as motivated by partisanship.
One scholar quipped that the caption of the first case, Republican
National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, "at least had
the virtue of candor." 200 Sadly, the lurid facts underlying the case
showed that this characterization was no exaggeration. In Wisconsin,
the governor, a Democrat, and the Republican-controlled legislature

were in a standoff leading up to the state's April presidential primary
election, which also featured a high-profile race for a seat on the
state's supreme court.2 01 Their disagreement was whether to make

further accommodations for voters in light of the spike in COVID

"offend the Elections Clause's textual commitment of responsibility for election
lawmaking to state and federal legislators, they do damage to faith in the written
Constitution as law, . .. and to the authority of legislatures"). This, of course, in addition to
the pattern of partisanship noted infra Section ILIE.
198 Huefner, supra note 84, at 290.

199 Robbins, supra note 57, at 1214.
200 Foley, supra note 127.
201 See Zach Montellaro, Coronavirus Crashes the Wisconsin Primary, POLMCO (Mar.
31, 2020, 5:35 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/31/coronavirus-crashes-

wisconsin-primary-157722.
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cases. 202 First, the legislature rejected the governor's proposal to ease
the state's voter ID law, registration requirements, and ballot receipt
restrictions; then the governor called a special session to address the
election concerns but was snubbed when the legislature gaveled in and
out within seconds; finally, the governor sought to postpone the con-

test until the summer, issuing an executive order that the state
supreme court invalidated along partisan lines. 203
At that point, the federal district court decision to extend the
ballot receipt date made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. There,
the Court's five Republican-appointed justices ruled for the RNC,
prevailing over the four appointed by Democrats, who sided with the
DNC. Clear differences aside, and in a case whose outcome would
advantage one political party over the other in the heat of an election,

both the majority and dissent avoided hinting at partisanship. And
while the Court attempted to frame the case as presenting just a

"narrow question," 2 04 the ugly partisan facts remained.
For nonlegal audiences-and even many legal ones-the partisan

implications of the decision were not the sideshow, but the main
attraction. 205 As one reporter noted, the suit raised much broader
questions than the Court would-or could-admit: "[W]hether the
empowered conservative majority has the situational awareness to
navigate the dire situation that faces the country, and whether it can
avoid further displays of raw partisanship that threaten to inflict

lasting institutional damage on the court itself." 20 6 Even after
answering with a sardonic "no," the Court did nothing to dispel the
202 See id. (noting that "Republican state legislative leaders balked at [Governor
Evers's] request [to mail every voter an absentee ballot in light of COVID-19 concerns],
calling it logistically impossible").
203 See Natasha Korecki & Zach Montellaro, Wisconsin Supreme Court Overturns
Governor, Orders Tuesday Elections to Proceed, PoLMCO, https://www.politico.com/news/
6 852 7
2020/04/06/wisconsin-governor-orders-stop-to-in-person-voting-on-eve-of-election-1

(Apr. 6, 2020, 7:59 PM).
204 Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1208 (2020)
(per curiam).
205 See, e.g., Scott Bauer & Steve Peoples, Wisconsin Moves Forward with Election
Virus Concerns, AP (Apr. 6, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/

Despite

97db30e6564b9b5eedfc300234ea6630 ("[T]he conservative-controlled Wisconsin Supreme
Court .

.

. said [the Democratic governor] didn't have the authority to reschedule the

race.. . . Conservative justices on the U.S. Supreme Court ... block[ed] Democratic efforts
to extend absentee voting . . . split[ting] 5-4, with the five Republican-appointed justices
siding with the national ...

party to .

.

. expand[] absentee voting."); Linda Greenhouse,

The Supreme Court Fails Us, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/
09/opinion/wisconsin-primary-supreme-court.html ("Was I the only one left in suspense on
Monday, holding out hope that the five Republican-appointed Supreme Court justices
would put partisanship aside and let the District Court order stand?").
206 Greenhouse, supra note 205.
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narrative that it was engaging in political-not legal-decisionmaking.

When the questions re-arose, in case after pandemic case, the Court
simply shrugged, issuing per curiam orders that broke down along partisan lines.
To be sure, the lineup did not strictly adhere to this pattern in
every case. Justice Breyer did not join the rest of the liberal bloc in
signing on to Justice Sotomayor's dissenting opinion in Raysor, for

example, and in Middleton, the liberal bloc noted no disagreement
with the outcome. 207 But silence does not necessarily signify agree-

ment, and this type of departure was the exception, not the rule. 208
Where the justices would fall in the pandemic cases was fairly easy to
predict because their opinions largely correlated with their partisan
affiliation.
Partisan splits in high Court decisions are nothing new, particularly in election law cases. 20 9 But that does not make them any less
troubling. Worse still is when these divisions occur while the election
is actually underway, and the chief justification for them is a murky,
ill-defined principle employed as a substitute for traditional legal analysis and reasoned decisionmaking. All too often, this is exactly what
occurred during the 2020 election cycle. "Even assuming that all the

justices were acting in good faith based solely on their fundamentally
divergent jurisprudential perspectives, the fact that this jurisprudential
divergence was fully congruent with the different partisan backgrounds of the justices inevitably created an awkward appearance in

an election case." 210 More than just "an awkward appearance," 2 1 1
Purcell in the pandemic demonstrates, at best, the dispiriting reality of
"polarization over voting rules and their judicialization by an increas207 See Raysor v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600, 2600-03 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan); Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9 (2020)
(demonstrating no disagreement on the part of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan).

208 The other notable exception was Chief Justice Roberts's break in a couple of cases
with the Court's other conservatives based on his view that Purcellapplies to federal courts
only. See supra Section III.D.

209 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123-31 (2000) (per curiam) (demonstrating the
partisan split through Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissenting from the
per curiam decision); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 318-93
(2010) (illustrating the divide with Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Chief
Justice Roberts on one side, while Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor
dissented); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 534-59 (2013) (revealing the partisan split
with Chief Justice Roberts delivering the majority opinion, joined by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Kennedy, Alito, and Justice Thomas concurring, while Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer dissented).
210 Foley, supra note 127.
211 Id.
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ingly polarized judiciary." 2 12 At worst, in the midst of a literal disaster
scenario, the principle permits partisanship-not the constitutional or
equitable principles-to drive legal decisions over who deserves
access to the vote.
CONCLUSION

Given the passage of time since it was decided, a deeper examination of Purcell is warranted. Still, it seems like no rush of judgment to
say that the opinion leaves much to be desired. Masquerading as wellreasoned and principled, Purcell is both unremarkable for its broader
pronouncements, and problematic for its lack of clarity and the perverse incentives it creates. It is self-contradictory, it undermines the

judiciary's role to ensure a fair political process, and it frequently
works to the detriment of the voters. Nowhere does Purcell suggest
that it should serve as "a magic wand that defendants can wave to
make any unconstitutional election restriction disappear so long as an
impending election exists." 213 And yet, due to the Supreme Court's
uncritical applications of it in Republican National Committee v.
Democratic National Committee and other cases reviewed during the
pandemic, Purcell "stands to become a major impediment to judicial

protection of voting rights." 2 14 Purcell only sullies U.S. election law
jurisprudence and the recurring references to it do not bode well for

American democracy. So, to those who find themselves facing obstacles to voting in this undefined period before an election, the future
may be very bleak. In the words of one eminent jurist: "Good luck
and G-d bless," because "[y]ou are going to need it."215

212 Richard L. Hasen, Optimism and Despair About a 2020 'Election Meltdown' and
Beyond, 100 B.U. L. REV. ONLINE 298, 301 (2020).
213 People First of Ala. v. Sec'y of State for Ala., 815 F. App'x 505, 514 (11th Cir. 2020)
(Rosenbaum, J. and Pryor, J., concurring) (denying stay of injunction).
214 Hasen, supra note 132, at 282.
215 Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 656 (7th Cir. 2020) (Rovner,
J., dissenting).
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